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Abstract
This paper builds on a previous series of papers  (see  electronic security infrastructure.  It also provides
Claessens,  Glaessner, and Klingebiel,  2001,  2002) that  examples of tradeoffs  that may arise with respect to
identified  electronic security  as a key component  to the  technological  innovation, privacy,  quality  of service,  and
delivery of electronic  finance benefits.  This paper and its  security in designing an electronic security policy
technical  annexes  (available separately at http://  framework.  Finally, it outlines  issues in seven
wwwl.worldbank.org/finance/)  identify and discuss  interrelated  areas that often need attention in  building an
seven key pillars necessary  to fostering a secure  adequate  electronic security infrastructure.  These are:
electronic  environment.  Hence,  it is intended  for those  * The legal framework and enforcement.
formulating broad policies  in the area of electronic  * Electronic  security of payment systems.
security and those working with financial  services  * Supervision  and prevention challenges.
providers  (for example,  executives  and management).  * The role of private insurance  as an essential
The detailed annexes of this paper are especially relevant  monitoring mechanism.
for chief information and security  officers  responsible for  * Certification,  standards, and the role of the public
establishing layered security.  and private  sectors.
First, this paper provides definitions  of electronic  * Improving the accuracy of information  on electronic
finance  and electronic  security and explains why these  security incidents and creating better arrangements for
issues deserve attention. Next, it presents a picture  of the  sharing this information.
burgeoning global electronic security industry. Then it  * Improving overall  education on these issues  as a  key
develops  a risk-management  framework  for  to enhancing prevention.
understanding the risks and tradeoffs  inherent in the
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Africa.I.  Introduction
Is it a fact... that, by means of electricity, the world of matter has become a great
nerve,  vibrating thousands of miles in a breathless point of time? Rather,  the
globe is a vast head, a brain, instinct with intelligence! Or shall we say it is itself
a thought, nothing but a thought.... -Nathaniel Hawthorne, 1851.
Even  before  the  events  of September  11,  electronic  security  was  a  growing  area  of
concern for banks and other financial services providers in managing daily operational risk. Now,
because of the rapid growth of wireless technology  and its increasing  use in providing financial
services  in emerging markets, either in coordination with the Internet or on a freestanding  basis,
there is even more demand for a careful look at issues related to electronic security.
This paper has three central  objectives. The first is to define electronic  security,  discuss
why this  issue is becoming important worldwide,  and characterize  the players in the burgeoning
worldwide electronic  security industry. The second  is to offer an economic  incentive framework
to  use  in  addressing  the  problems  posed  by  electronic  security,  with  particular  attention  to
financial  services provided by banks. The third is to identify  seven distinct pillars of reform that
every country should construct and maintain to develop a secure electronic environment.
In meeting  these  objectives,  the  paper  addresses  the  following  public  policy  questions
relevant to the future security of the global financial  system:
*  Are financial services providers given proper incentives to fully share timely and accurate
information  with law enforcement on security breaches? If not, is there a form of market
failure taking place in this area within the financial services industry? What actions might
be taken to facilitate public-private cooperation to remedy the situation? (See Sections II,
III, and X.)
*  What  kinds  of changes  or  additions  to  the  legal  and  regulatory  framework  will  be
consistent  with  proper  law  enforcement  within  and  across  country  boundaries?  (See
Sections V and VI and Annex IV.)
*  What  role  should government  play in setting  policies,  standards,  and  guidelines  for e-
security? How can it strike the proper balance between fostering technological innovation
and establishing e-security standards?  (See Sections IV and V and Annex IV.)
*  What  role  should  government  play  in  regulating  and  supervising  not  only  financial
services  providers  but  also  third-party  providers,  such  as money  transmitters,  hosting
companies, ISP providers, and electronic security vendors? (See Sections VI and VII.)
*  How  should  electronic  records  or  transactions  be  verified or authenticated?  What  role
should the  government  and the private  sector play in certification?  (See Section IX and
Annex II.)
*  What role can the private insurance industry play, especially in emerging markets, which
often  lack  extensive  human  capital  and  capacity  in  regulatory  agencies?  Can  it  offer
incentives  to guide  business toward  a risk-management  and risk-mitigation approach?
How can layered  security  help  in monitoring the  operational  and other risks created by
electronic security breaches?  (See Section VIII.)
*  What roles  can the  government, private  market participants,  and the  electronic  security
industry play in  accurately  measuring  the extent of electronic  security risk within  and
across  countries?  How  can  institutions  improve  their information  and  databases  from
which to measure this risk? (See Section X.)
2*  How  can  complementary  and  reinforcing  actions  be  taken  to  ensure  better  electronic
security  in  emerging  market  countries  where  regulatory,  supervisory,  and  enforcement
institutions are not strong? (See Sections IX, X, and )I.)
The answers to many of these questions are interrelated,  and this paper approaches  them
in a  systemic  manner.  The annexes  offer  a more detailed  and  technical  analysis of the  issues.
Included  also  is a  glossary  of terms.  Hence,  the  paper is  intended  for those  formulating  broad
policies  in the area of electronic  security,  those working  with financial  services providers  (e.g.,
systems  administrators  in these  entities),  vendors  of electronic  security  or  other products  (i.e.,
front-end  Internet  platforms  provided by  a hosting  or  portal  company)  that  outsource  to  such
financial  services  providers,  and  other  participants  in  what  is  becoming  a  global  electronic
security industry.
The paper is divided into  11 sections.  Each of sections II through XI addresses  one set of
the  questions  raised  above.  Section  II  defines  electronic  finance  and  security  as  used  in  the
context of this paper; it explains why these issues will increase  in importance as dependence  on
new technologies  spreads into emerging markets and  leapfrogging becomes a reality.  Section m
characterizes the functional  categories  of the global  electronic  security industry and describes  its
links  to  e-fmance.  Section  IV  delineates  a  risk-management  framework  for  thinking  about
electronic security  and outlines the elements necessary for policy development to ensure  adequate
electronic  security.  Section  V  outlines  legal  and  enforcement  issues.  Section VI examines  the
complexities  of electronic  security  with  respect  to payment  systems  and  money  transmitters.
Section VII examines  supervision and prevention  of security breaches, including new approaches
to oversight  and inspection of security  systems at financial  services providers  or nondepository
institutions  that  act  as money  transmitters.  Section  VIII  explores  the  opportunities  for private
insurance  to participate  in  creating  a  risk-sharing  approach  to  electronic  security.  Section  DC
examines certification  issues within the electronic  security industry,  as well as the specific topic
of electronic  messages  or  signatures  and  the  appropriate  role  of the  govemment.  Section  X
suggests  possibilities  for  developing  public-private  partnership  to  improve  the  accuracy  and
availability of information about electronic security incidents.  Section XI examines education as a
key to improving protection against e-security incidents.
This  paper treats  the  rapidly  evolving  are  of electronic  security  from a  perspective  of
technology. Too little is known about this subject  in emerging markets.  The paper focuses more
attention on the United  States, because the Intemet originated there and because the defense  and
law  enforcement  agencies  there  have  more  experience  in  ensuring  electronic  security.  It also
focuses on some of the more advanced  economies  in Europe, as well as on Singapore and Hong
Kong,  to  examine  how  electronic  security  issues have  been  addressed  in  those  areas.  Clearly,
more research  is needed  to understand  the  specific problems  of emerging  markets as well  as to
identify  critical  areas  of legislation  and  relevant  institutional  arrangements  needed  to improve
electronic  security  standards  worldwide.  Unless  it  protects  its  information  assets,  the  great
potential electronic  commerce offers can be significantly compromised.
H.  What Is Electronic Security and Why Is It Needed?
Definitions of  E-Finance  and  E-Securi*y
To  understand  the need  for  electronic  security,  one  must  first precisely  define what  is
meant by electronic  finance. For purposes of this paper, e-finance  is the use of electronic  means)
3to  exchange  infornation,  to  transfer  signs  and  representations  of  value,  and  to  execute
transactions  in a commercial  environment.  E-fmance  comprises four primary channels: electronic
funds  transfers  (EFTs);  electronic  data  interchange  (EDI);  electronic  benefits transfers  (EBTs);
and electronic trade confirmations (ETCs).
EFT, which began in the early 1960s, is the oldest form of electronic money transmittal.
The  amount of money moving by EFT is  $2 trillion per day and growing.  The volume of EFT
usage  worldwide  is  677,411,204  transactions.'  The  second  oldest  form of electronic  money
movement  is  EDI. EDI is used to  effect money  payment  orders  and bar  coding.  Bar coding  is
operational  in more than 70 countries worldwide.  Its use has doubled in the past five years and is
equal to 50 to 75 percent of purchases worldwide. The third oldest channel is EBT. Benefits have
been transferred  electronically for a decade in more than 37 countries worldwide,  including many
emerging  economies.  In the United  States alone,  EBT moves  $500 billion in cash entitlements,
such as food stamps, Social Security payments, and child assistance  benefits. The total volume of
EBT transactions in the United States is 568,981,051 annually.2
E-security can be described on the one hand as those policies, guidelines, processes,  and
actions needed to enable  electronic transactions  to be carried out with a minimum risk of breach,
intrusion, or theft. On the other hand, e-security is any tool, technique, or process used to protect
a system's information assets. Information  is a valuable strategic  asset that must be managed and
protected  accordingly. The degree of e-security used for any activity should be proportional to the
activity's  underlying  value.  Thus,  security  is a risk-management  or risk-mitigation  tool,  and
appropriate security means mitigation of the risk for the underlying transaction  in proportion to its
value.
The  need  for  security  is  a  constant  of doing  business  over  the  Intemet  because,  in
essence,  the  Intemet  is  a  broadcast  medium.  E-security  enhances  or  adds  value  to  a  naked
network  and  is  composed  of both  a  "soft"  and  a  "hard"  infrastructure.  Soft  infrastructure
components  are  those  policies,  processes,  protocols,  and  guidelines  that  create  the protective
environment to keep the system and the data from compromise.  The hard  infrastructure  consists
of the actual hardware and software  needed to protect  the system and its data from external  and
internal threats to security.
The Potential  Growth of  Electronic Transactions
The volume and variety of electronic financial services have increased significantly,  and
use of the electronic  medium to do business, whether online or through remote mechanisms, has
spread  rapidly  over  the  past  decade.  Countries,  not just  consumers,  are  increasingly  getting
connected.  As is evident in Figure  1, "these new technologies not only allow countries to leapfrog
in  connectivity,  they  also  open  new  channels  for  delivering  e-fmancial  services"  (Claessens,
Glaessner,  and Klingebiel,  2001).  Since  the  mid-1990s,  investment  in banking  technology  has
focused  on online  banking  and  brokerage  services  to increase  convenience  and  also to reduce
costs.
Concurrent  with these realities,  four new technology-related  financial services  industry
trends have occurred:  outsourcing, open architecture,  integrated strategies, and new methods of e-
payment.  The  new  trends have  been  driven  by considerations  of cost  reduction  and need  for
improvement in quality of service, yet in the process of putting them in place, security issues have
X  U.S. Department of the Treasury 2001.
2 U.S. Department of  the Treasury 2001  statistics.
4too often been presumed  to be less important or sometimes taken for granted. Figure  1 illustrates
the projected rates of e-finance penetration worldwide.
Figure 1. E-Finance  Penetration: 2000 and Projected Rates for 2005 and 2010
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Source: Authors' calculations.
By  2005,  the  share  of banking that  is  done  online  could rise  from  8.5  percent  to  50
percent in industrial countries,  and from 1 percent to  10 percent in emerging markets. With better
5connectivity,  online  banking  transactions  in  emerging  markets  could  rise  even  further  to  20
percent by 2005 (Glaessner,  Claessens, and Klingebiel, 2001).  Some estimate that $6.3 trillion of
bank-to-bank transactions will be online by 2005.3
A parallel trend to the global use of e-fmance is the adoption of  new technologies that can
act to expand  the scope for electronic  finance and access  to financial  services. Emerging  markets
increasingly  find  it  more  advantageous  to  use  "new"  technologies,  such  as  wireless  cellular
technology,  for  e-fmance  as  opposed  to  the  Internet.  Table  1 indicates  that  in  a  variety  of
emerging  markets,  wireless  technology,  as  measured  by  cell  phone  penetration,  is  rapidly
outstripping Internet penetration.
Table 1. Global Connectivity  Trends
Country  Number ofmobile phone  Percentage  ofpopulation  Percentage  of
subscribers  (Millions)  who are mobile or  population  who are
cellular  subscribers  Internet users
Developed  Countries a  30.0  56  32
Australia  8.6  45  35
Finland  3.7  72  38
France  29.1  49  14
United States  109.0  40  35
United Kingdom  43.5  73  30
Developing  Countries'  6.9  7  2
Brazil  23.2  14  3
Bulgaria  .6  7  5
Cambodia  .1  1  <1
China  84.5  7  2
Egypt  1.4  2  1
Guatemala  .7  6  <1
India  3.6  < 1  <1
Indonesia  3.7  2  <1
Mexico  14.1  14  3
Philippines  6.5  8  3
Republic of Korea  26.8  57  40
South Africa  8.3  19  5
Source: International  Telecommunications  Union, World Telecommunications Indicators  Database  2000.
a! These are averages for developed  and developing countries respectively.
The Risks of New Technologies
With the benefits  of new technology  also  come new  and  potentially  virulent risks  (see
Figure 2). Table 2 shows that since  1995, incident reports increased 61  percent between 2000 and
2001  in  the  United  States  alone.  Technology  facilitates  more  efficient  and  quicker  ways  to
commit old  crimes  such  as fraud  and theft.  Remote  access,  high-quality  graphics  and printing,
and new multipurpose tools and platformns  provide  greater means to commnit  such crimes as theft
and impersonation  online.4 Disturbingly,  as the technology becomes  more complex,  a perpetrator
needs  fewer  skills  to  commit  these  crimes.  For  example,  the  art of online  penetrations  (i.e.,
hacking)  was  once a  highly  sophisticated  skill.  The information  age,  however, -has permitted  a
3Jupiter Comnmunications  2001.
4 Ibid.
6breeding ground for underground hacker Web sites that now supply dubious individuals with the
multifaceted  tools  necessary  to  break  into  financial  platforms.  Such  Web  sites  as
www.astalavista.box.sk  and www.attrition.org  supply complex  malicious  codes  and viruses that
enable novice users to penetrate banking systems.
Figure 2. Increase in Incident Reports
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- The most frightening aspect of the convergence of technology  and crime is the magnitude
of the crimes that can be carried out quite speedily. For instance, in the past it would have taken
months  or perhaps  even years for highly organized criminals to steal 50,000 credit card numbers.
Today,  one criminal  using tools that are  freely available on the Web can hack into a database and
steal that number of identities in seconds. Or a perpetrator can steal a laptop containing a database
of 400,000  names  and their associated credit  card information.  These are the reasons e-security
must be taken very seriously.
Although e-finance  offers an opportunity  for developing market economies to leapfrog, it
is not a panacea.  The Internet Data Corporation (www.idc.com)  recently reported  that more than
57 percent of all hack attacks last year were initiated in the financial sector. Traditional risks have
thus been reshaped.  In the physical enviromnent,  frauds traditionally were paper-based  or people-
based, whereas the following are the means most often used to commit crimes online:
*  Message interception and alteration
*  Unauthorized account access
*  Identity theft
*  Manipulation  of stocks and bonds
*  Extortion
*  Unauthorized system access (e.g., system damage, degradation, or denial of service)
*  Industrial espionage
*  Manipulation of e-payment systems
7Table 2. Reported E-Security Intrusions
Date of  Attack  Compromised financial  and  e-  Name of hacker,  group, or  Various losses sustained because of the  intrusion into  the financial
commerce entities  malicious  tool  entity's networks
Sept.  18,  1995  Citibank'  Vladimir Levin  $  10,000,0002
Mar.  1, 2000  U.K., U.S., Thailand,  and  Alias "CURADOR"  28,000 accounts compromised,  with total losses exceeding $3.5 million.
3
Canada's e-finance  and e-
commerce sites
Mar.  15,2000  Internet Trading Technologies  Abelkader Smires  Denial-of-service  attacks that caused major disruption  of trading on the
NASDAQ.
Aug. 10,2000  Bloomberg'  Oleg  Zesev  and  Igor  Broke into the Bloomberg computer  system in Manhattan in an attempt
Yarimaka  to extort $200,000.
Dec. 22,2000  EggHead  Eastem European groups  Hackers  compromise  database  of  thousands  of  credit  cards;  on
Christmas Eve, many of the cards were then "salami  sliced." 6
2001  Hong Kong  Various Hackers  Eight cases  of e-banking  theft were  recorded  in the  year  involving the
loss of over $4.4M.
7
Mar. 8,2001  40  domestic  e-banking  and  e-  Eastem  European  cinminal  Intruders  stole  credit  card  account  information  and  other  data  by
commerce sites  syndicate  exploiting  a  Windows  NT security  flaw; -the  National  Infrastructure
Protection Center labeled this attack the 'largest  Internet attack to date."
Apr.  12, 2001  VISA  Eastern  European groups  Intruders  gained  access  to its  computer  network  in the  U.K. and  later
demanded  ransom  for data  obtained  in the  virtual  break-in;  company
received  a ransom demand of £L0 million.
Jun:  5, 2001  Central Texas Bank
9 Vasilly Gorshov and Alexey  They had access  to the  bank's system  for six months before they  were
Ivanov  detected.
Jul. 6, 2001  SI  (a host company)"  Investigation ongoing  The  compromise  of  more  than  300 banks  and  credit  unions  whose
systems were hosted by Si."
Jul.  14,2001  Australia's  Online  Trading  Black  Orifice-Trojan  Account data of more than 40,000  of their clients  was compromised.
Systems  Horse
Aug. 21,2001  Riggs Bank,  First Virginia Banks,  Investigaton ongoing  The account information  of more  than 4,000 account holders from these
SunTrust, and Visa  banks who used Visa debit cards  was compromised;  banks were  forced
to cancel all debit cards.  12
Sept. 3, 2001  Intrusions  into  banking  and  e-  Eastem European groups  Various extortions.'
3
commerce sites
Sept. 20, 2001  Deutsche Bank'
4 Nimda worm  Unknown-costs of breaches indeterminable.
Feb. 7,2002  U.S. Treasury  Direct'"  Louis Lebaga  $158  million-Lebaga  was  apprehended  only  after  attempting  to  steal
$1.3 billion more five days later.
Mar.  1, 2002  Prudential  Insurance Company  Donald McNeese  McNeese was arrested for the theft and credit card scam stemming from
the  hack  of  Prudential's  database,  compromising  60,000  personal
records of  employees there. 16
Apr.  5, 2002  State  of  California,  Payroll  Investigation  Ongoing  The  hacker  copied  265,000  state  employee  account  names  and  social
database  security numbers, thus making them vulnerable to ID theft.
Apr.  12,2002  Republic Bank  Investigation Ongoing  The  hacker copied  3,600  bank customer  account names  and  files,  thus
making  them  vulnerable  to  ID theft;  by  exploiting  SI's  (the  hosting
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8The  tremendous  growth  in  open  networks  has  created  a  penetrable  electronic
environment akin to a circle of Swiss cheese pieces. Financial institutions are increasingly relying
on technology  to process, store, and retrieve  data, but advances in computer  hardware,  software,
and  communications  technology  increase  the  financial  industry's  vulnerability  to  internal  and
external attacks. Without strong security controls, banks risk the possibility of financial loss, legal
liability, and reputation harm.
The insecurity  of the Internet further  exposes financial  institutions to undetected,  globial,
and virtually instantaneous  attacks on internal systems and proprietary information.  This includes
attacks  by  foreign  governments  and  terrorists,  as  well  as  attacks  by  criminals  or  hackers
originating  domestically.  Banks  and  vendors  with  weak  security  controls  are  susceptible  to
business  disruptions,  theft  of  data,  sabotage,  corruption  of  key  records,  and  fraud.  The
development  of wireless  Intemet  access  will further  compound the problem (see Annex E)  by
enabling foreign governments, terrorists,  criminals, and hackers, singly or in concert, to operate in
countries  that  do not  have  the  advanced  communications  infrastructure  or  adequate  security
protocols in place. Hence, building awareness now of the criticality of the risks associated with e-
finance and promoting industry use of aggressive mitigation is crucial.
Despite the relative  lack of accurate  information  about actual  intrusions and associated
losses, Table 2 highlights  some the most pervasive venues  for electronic attacks  in the area of e-
financial  services that have been publicly documented.  The most frequent problems in this arena
are (i) insider abuse, (ii) identity theft, (iii) fraud, and (iv) breaking and entering, often conducted
by hackers.
Just  as  legitimate  use  is  increasing  at  a  phenomenal  rate,  nefarious  activity  is  also
growing rapidly. Identity theft is the number one crime in the United States. Reported incidents of
identity theft are projected  to more than  double,  from 700,0005  in 2001  to  1.7 million in  2005,
and the costs to U.S. financial  institutions alone will increase 30 percent each year, to more than
$8  billion  in  2005.6  These  numbers  do  not  take into  account  the  wide  range  of social  costs
associated with this crime, such as litigation expenses, or the lost hours to redeem one's name or
credit  information.  In  fact,  these' calculations  do  not  include  the  very  substantial  losses  for
financial services providers generated by denial-of-service  attacks. Table 3 suggests that denial of
service can cost an average-size  brokerage  firm $6.5 million an hour or a credit card authorization
company  $2.6  million  an  hour.  And  these  estimates  do not  include  the  costs  of damage  to
reputation.  Box  1 provides  a  graphic  example  of how  pervasive  a problem  identity  theft  has
become.
Table 3. Potential Losses from a Denial-of-Service  Attack7
Business type  Brokerage  firm  Credit card  Automated teller  Major online auction
authorization  company  machines  site
Exposure/Hour  $6.5 million/hr  $2.6 million/hr  $14,500/hr in fees  $70,000/hr
Source: Red Herring, December 2000.
Hacking,  too,  is  endemic.  Law  enforcement  agencies  have  documented  that  Eastern
European  organized  hacker  groups  have  penetrated  hundreds  of banks  worldwide.  The  FBI's
5  This figure represents a yearly trend within the United States only.
6Published  in a 2001  report by Celent Communications.  The projections were made using data from the Federal Trade
Commission.
7 Network shutdown.
9computer crimes division,  the National  Infrastructure  Protection Center (NIPC),  notes that many
banks  are  paying  off extortion  demands  for  fear  of risking  their  reputations  and  losing  their
customer  bases  to  competitors.  The  Egghead  hacking  incident  of 2001  represented  a case  of
extortion.  Hackers  penetrated  a  database  containing  10,000  credit  card  numbers  and  then
demanded that the company  pay them a large  sum of cash to protect against the posting of those
numbers  in  a  chat  room.  Despite  hackers'  assurances  to  the  contrary,  every  one  of  those
compromised  cards was charged a twelve dollar fee.
Figure 3. Hack Attacks in Asia (by Industry)
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Viruses  are another  computer-transmitted  disease  that swiftly  compromises  a  system's
integrity.  A virus  sets  up residence  in a  system,  and  it is virtually  impossible  to kill it without
replacing  the  infected  parts  of the system.  Viruses  did  not  exist before  the early  1980s.  Only
recently  have  countries  implemented  legislation  that  makes  infecting  a  system  with  a  virus  a
crime.8
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The banking system is no more vulnerable  than the securities  or the insurance  industries.
The  U.S. Treasury recently discovered  an infiltration  of the electronic  distribution  system for its
securities (see  Box  2).  In this  case,  defects in the risk-management  processes  employed by U.S.
Treasury  Direct  in  permitting  access  led  to  a  situation  in which  one  individual  who  was  not
creditworthy was almost able to compromise the whole system.
8Robert J.  Morris wrote a conputer program known as a worm that brought U.S.  computers to an abrupt
halt in 1988.
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Both examples  im the boxes illustrate that the overall  risk-management  system permits a
breach. Usually the problem is not the result of the adoption of a specific technology but happens
because appropriate risk-management processes were not implemented.
Trends in cyber crime reveal significant growth. Attacks on servers doubled in 2001  from
2000. The 2002  CSI/FBI Computer Crime  Survey9 reported that  90 percent of organizations  in
the  United  States  (including  large  companies,  medical  institutions,  and  government  agencies)
detected  security  breaches.  Moreover,  70  percent  in  2001  versus  about  60  percent  in  2000
reported serious security breaches such as theft of proprietary information, financial  fraud, denial-
of-service  attacks, and compromising of networks.  In most of these cases, the organizations  cited
their Internet connection  as the critical  point of attack.  The 2002 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and
Security  Survey also indicated that 273 companies lost more than $266 million.  Most important,
according  to  U.S.  law  enforcement  authorities,  these  numbers  are  likely  to  understate  actual
intrusions  and  associated  losses.  When  considered  worldwide,  these  trends  are  even  more
troubling,  given  the  relative  sophistication  of the  U.S.  security  industry  and  the  protections
employed by financial services providers.
In the United  States,  a  2001  CSI/FBI Computer Crime  Survey  identified  the  following
five major reasons organizations did not report electronic intrusions to law enforcement:
*  Negative publicity.
*  Negative  information  competitors  would  use  to their advantage-for  example,  to  steal
customers.
*  Lack of awareness that they could report events.
9  See http://www.gocsi.com/
11*  Decision that a civil remedy seemed best.
*  Fear among IT personnel of reporting incident because ofjob security.
Lack of accurate  intrusion reporting to regulators  and law enforcement is the core reason
that issues related to electronic security are not being recognized as an immediate priority.
IH.  The Electronic  Security Industry
Today's  electronic  security  industry  boasts  an  ever-growing  array  of companies.  The
types  and numbers  of choices  can be confusing for the  expert  and overwhelming  to the novice.
These companies  are involved in every facet of securing the networks used by financial  services
providers.  They range  from  those  that provide  active  content  filtering  and  monitoring  services
(even virus detection companies are  an example)  to those that undertake  intrusion detection tests,
create  firewalls,  undertake  penetration  testing,  develop  encryption  software  and  services,  and
offer authentication  services.
In scope,  the e-security  industry  increasingly  is becoming  a  worldwide  presence  as  it
grows  parallel  with  the  expanding  connectivity  to  the  Intemet.  The  growing  integration  of
technologies among the Intemet, wireless,  Intemet provider (IP), telephone, and satellite will also
present new challenges  for electronic  security  and the structure of the financial  services industry
and e-finance.
From the vantage point of financial services providers,  the earlier the security is built into
the design process, the greater will be their return on investment in security-related  services. For
example,  studies show that spending $1 to fix a vulnerability  during the design process saves  $99
of the  $100  that must be spent  later when  the system  is implemented  (See  Berinato  2002;  Soo
Hoo 2001). This cost avoidance or cost savings  makes or breaks many IT projects.  The increasing
extent to which technology  platforms  drive financial  services  and the increasing  rates at which
computer  electronic  security  incidents  are  occurring  emphasize  the  importance  of using  risk
management in making business decisions to avoid greater future costs.
Electronic Security Vendors
A rich variety of vendors  operate  in what is becoming  a global  industry  for electronic
security.  Many  types  of companies  operate  in  this  industry.  In  the  United  States  alone,  $5.1
billion in security software was sold in the year 2000-a 33 percent increase over the prior year.'°
These  companies  are  involved  in  every  facet  of securing  the  wide  area networks  over which
financial  services  are  provided.  The  following  is  a brief description  of the major  categories  of
vendors. (See also Figure 3.)
Active  Content Monitoring and Filtering."  Companies  involved  with  active  content
monitoring  and  filtering produce  tools that  examine  for potentially  destructive  content  material
entering  a network.  These  vendors  provide  tools to monitor  all  content  entering  a network  for
malicious  codes,  such  as harmful  attributes.  Trojans,  worms,  and  viruses  are  methods  used  to
deploy  an attack once  the perpetrator  enters  the system.  Viruses  are programs  that  infect  other
programs on the same system by replicating  themselves. Virus  scanners are critical  in mitigating
10 See Cunningham,  "Digital  Security:  Heightened Risks Demand Innovation,"  Red Herring.  July 2001.
' For more details on this facet of the industry, see Annex  11.
12these attacks.  Vendors of virus  scanners provide  software  that scans and cleans networks  and is
periodically updated.
Intrusion Detection  Systems  Vendors. 1
2 Companies  that  produce  network  intrusion
detection systems provide products to monitor network traffic and alert the systems administrator
with an alarm when someone is attempting to gain unauthorized access.
Firewall Vendors.'3 Companies  that produce  firewalls provide a virtual  "security guard"
at the  gate  of the  customer's  facilities.  A firewall  is  a  system  that  enforces  the  access-control
policy between two networks.  Vendors create these virtual guards to protect a network's integrity.
Penetration Testing Companies.' 4 These  consultmg  organizations  simulate  attacks  on
networks to test for a system's inherent  weaknesses.  They then patch the holes found during the
simulated  attacks.  Typically,  vulnerability-based  scanning  tools provide  a current  snapshot of a
system's vulnerabilities.
Cryptographic  Communications Vendors.'5 Vendors who  supply this product  enable the
client  company  to  protect  its  communications  with  an  encryption  envelope.  Encryption  uses
complex algorithms to shield messages transmitted  over public  channels. It provides safe passage
from point  A to point  B.  When  the  message  reaches  its  destination,  the  recipient  uses  another
algorithmic  key to open it. It is highly recommended  for use by mobile workforces  and/or large
noncentralized  corporations or institutions.
Aluthentication Vendors. Authentication  asks users such questions as "Who are you?" and
"Are you allowed to do that?" and permits a user to access the system only if these questions are
answered  correctly.  This  type of service  can be  broken  into four general  categories:  passwords,
tokens or smart cards, biometrics,  and encryption.  (See Annex I for more details.)
Links to E-Finance
Because E-security  companies are becoming increasingly global in nature, it is important
when designing public policy  to understand  the links between  such companies and the electronic
finance industry. Figure 4 provides a stylistic example of some of the links among the many types
of vendors of electronic  security services and financial  services providers.
Figure 4 also shows a potentially disturbing reality about the electronic  security industry.
One vendor may provide multiple services to several  interlinked customers.  For instance, a
vendor may provide security to the financial services provider's online platform.  This same
vendor also may provide security services directly to the bank for its offline computer systems. In
addition, it may supply security services to the hosting company. Telecommunication  companies
in many emerging markets provide hosting-or what many refer to as "e-enabling services"-to
the banking community. By establishing  a convenient online platform that customers can access







13Figure 4. E-Security Industry and E-Finance
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In many  emerging markets, the telecom  company  may have  an interest in or own outright
the ISP provider and the hosting company  and may  provide various  forms of financial  services as
well.  Moreover,  many  telecom companies also have multiple  interests  in many different forms of
technology  providers, from  fixed-line  telephony  to wireless  to  satellites.  This  industry  structure
should  raise concern-it  signifies  the  need to  discuss  and  debate  difficult public  policy  issues
now, such as competition  policy,  and how these issues might be addressed  in designing  new legal
and  regulatory  elements  of the  present  frameworks  (see  Claessens,  Glaessner,  and  Klingebiel
2002 ).
Along with a complex industrial  organization,  convergence in technologies  will present special
challenges  in the design of public policies relating to electronic security.  Specifically,  increasing
points of vulnerability  will exist, and any well-designed  electronic security system must address
them. These  new points of vulnerability might include the potential  interfaces  between  customer
access  devices, such as a PC with modems, land-line  phones that can be linked with any Internet
platform through voice recognition, wireless  phones, or personal digital assistants (PDAs) with an
online platform. The point at which the message leaps from one
14channel to another is the point at which it is most vulnerable. Hence,  financial  services providers
will need to address a much wider array of risks and expend effort to define liability,  and public
policymakers  will need to examine  the impacts of potential  weaknesses,  given what is already  a
complex e-finance industrial structure.
Box 3  highlights an inherent conflict:  The need to secure  systems against physical risks that can
involve  use  of multiple  technologies  in  different  locations  runs  up  against  the  fact  that  the  most
distributed  and decentralized  networks are  more vulnerable  to  interception  and unauthorized  access at
the point of interface.  As technologies converge,  development  of more effective standards  for securing
such points of interface  will become far more important.
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One example  of how convergence of technologies  creates vulnerability  occurs when a wireless
Groupe  Sp6cial  Mobile  (GSM)  phone  is  used  to  initiate  a transaction  through  an  interface  with  the
Internet  (e.g.,  via  indicating  transactions  on  the  online  platform  of the  fmnancial  services  provider).
16 Very Small Aperture  Terminal, but more simply put it describes a small satellite terminal that can be used for one-
way and/or interactive communications  via satellite.
15Specifically,  a  secure  way  of integrating  between  the  two  technologies-GSM  and  the Internet-is
needed.  This typically  requires  seamnless  connectivity  and  an  integration  of standards,  including  those
for  security  worldwide,  that  are  not  in  place  today.  Wireless  messages  have  to  travel  through  a
gateway,'7 which  channels  them  to  a  wired  network  (e.g.,  the  Internet)  for retransmission  to  their
ultimate  destination.  At the  gateway,  the  message  sent  and  encrypted  in  GSM  using  what is  called
Wireless  Application  Protocol  (WAP)  and  the  associated  use  of Wireless  Transport  Layer  Security
(WTLS)  must be  converted  into the industry  standard  for  secure  messaging  over  a wired  network-
secure socket layer (SSL). At this point (in the gateway),  the message will be unencrypted before being
reencrypted,  and there is vulnerability
IV.  Electronic  Security  Infrastructure  in  a  Risk-Management
Framework
Regulation of  the Electronic  Security Industry
To  develop  a  framework  for  thinking  about  the  public  policy  issues  that  arise  in
examining  electronic  security,  it  is  necessary  to  identify  the  fundamental  source  of "public
interest" and the case  for regulation  in this area.  For several  reasons,  electronic security  warrants
some form of public intervention now.
First,  financial services  and the payment system in particular, or banking more broadly,
constitute  one  of the  eight  identified  areas  of "critical  infrastructure."'8 A  compromise  of the
payments system caused by illegal access  and hacking  can have broad ramifications  for an entire
economy,  as could  similar  impacts  in  other critical  infrastructure  areas,  from  transportation  to
energy, and so on. Hence, the public interest and welfare are potentially at risk when business and
commerce fail to meet certain minimum electronic security  standards.
Second,  the  role  of government  and  law  enforcement  can  be justified  on much  more
familiar  classic  market-failure  grounds.19 Specifically,  the  existing  base  of information  that
supports projections  about the extent  of the  electronic  security problem is substantially  flawed.
This  is because  financial  services  providers,  hosting companies,  and  other enabling  companies
have  inadequate incentives  to report intrusion or penetration  information  accurately,  given their
legitimate  concerns  about  the  disclosure  of such  information  and  its  potential  damage  to both
their reputation  and public confidence  in their business.  In  this  case,  insurance  markets  cannot
price the insurance risk in an actuarially fair manner. Similarly, information technology is subject
to large increasing returns to scale on both the demand side and the supply side  (see,  e.g., Shapiro
and  Varian  1999).  Market  outcomes  in  such  industries  (including  financial  services,  which  is
heavily dependent  on IT)  will tend to be somewhat  concentrated  and  often will require industry
standardization and coordination.
'7  For more detailed  analysis of this problem, see Annex III.
'8 The Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63  (PDD-63), issued by the Clinton
Administration in 1998, provided a starting point for addressing cyber risks against the United States. This directive
identified the critical sectors of an electronically dependent economy  and assigned lead agencies to coordinate sector
cyber-security efforts. This directive  identified eight sectors-finance,  transportation,  energy, water, government,
aviation, telecommunications,  and emergency-presenting  the vision that "the United  States will take all necessary
measures  to eliminate swiftly any significant vulnerability to both physical and  cyber attacks on our critical
infrastructures,  including  especially our cyber systems."
'9  Classic reasons for a failure in a market are asymmetric information,  increasing retums to scale, and network
externalities.  See Bator (1999 ), Varian et al. (1999 ), and Kahn (1999).
16Any  approach  to  defining  public  policies  through  law  and  regulations  (including
prudential regulations,  such as capital standards) must account for the impacts electronic security
considerations  or the lack thereof have on a set of risks. Specifically,  financial services providers
react  to  incentives.  In  many  cases,  analysts  pressure  financial  services  providers  to  produce
targeted  returns,  while  at  the  same  time  pushing  them  to  outsource  in  order  to  reduce  costs.
Meanwhile,  technological  advances  have  created  a  much  more  complex  inter-relationship
between  electronic  security  and  risks  of  different  types.  In  effect,  electronic  security  and
electronic  finance  can  have  an  impact  on  operational  risk,  risk  of  identity  theft,  fraud  and
extortion, credit  quality deterioration,  and systemic risk, and can  even have implications  for the
risks in undertaking  failure resolution.
Operational Risk.  Inadequate  electronic  security  can  result  in  interruptions  of service
and-in some cases,  depending on the nature and adequacy of backup systems-even the loss of
critical information. As part of managing operational risk, financial  services providers worldwide
need to pay greater attention to the way they secure their IT systems. As discussed in Section VII,
the risks involved in electronic security often relate to extortion and reputation risk, which usually
are not specifically taken into account in the allocations set aside to cover operational  risk.
Risk  of Identity  Theft,  Fraud, and Extortion.  As  noted  in  Section  II,  penetration  by
hackers often  leads to extortion  demands.  In addition,  identity theft is a growing concern  for e-
finance  service  providers.  Its  growth  has  been  rapid,  but  as  in  the  case  of hacking,  it  is not
reported in a timely manner or accurately;  thus, its growth may be considerably understated. This
problem  is  not unique  to  financial  services-it  also  affects  the  integrity  and  reliability  of the
credit information gathered and assessed by credit bureaus, downstream to credit decisions.
Risk of Credit Quality Deterioration  for the Financial  Services Provider. Although not
often  acknowledged,  a substantial  denial of service  or long-term  intrusion that results  in fraud,
impersonation,  or corruption  of data  can  effectively  cripple  a bank's operations  for  a  period  of
time.  If that  time  is  sufficient,  it  can  irreparably  damage  the  bank's  reputation  and  possibly
compromise its credit standing. Because market participants'  confidence is critical,  such an event
could have a pernicious impact in a relatively short time.
Systemic Risk.  One of the most important links between  e-fmance,  e-security,  and risk is
the  systemic  impact that  the  associated  risks can  have  on the related payment  systems  through
interaction with compromised networks. Appropriate  security  should be proportional  to the value
of underlying  transactions.  For this reason,  in the case  of large-value  clearinghouses,  extensive
electronic  security is or should be in place. Any intrusion or interruption in a payment system's
electronic messaging could easily create significant system-wide exposure.
Risks  in  Failure  Resolution.  A  final  form  of risk associated  with  the  delivery  of e-
financial  services  and  security relates to the risks introduced when a brick-and-clicks  or wholly
Intemet-based  bank fails. Here the process of closure  itself is difficult to  define and even more
difficult to implement if the entity has its servers in offshore  centers. Closure  in this case would
require  extensive  cross-border  coordination  among  authorities  in  what  could  be  numerous
disparate jurisdictions. Cooperation, and thus closure, may not be feasible with the speed that can
be  applied in the case  of a non-Intemet-based  bank. At the point of intervention,  if the records
and  other  essential  informnation  about  digital  assets  are  not  preserved  under  well-defined
guidelines, and if they are not secured or cannot be retrieved  from servers, then, at the very least,
claimants' rights may be compromised.
17Trade-Offs: Security,  Quality of Service, Privacy,  Technological Innovation, and Costs
Designing  public  policy  in this  highly  complex  area  requires  balancing  a  number  of
essential trade-offs in creating legislation and regulation.  This even applies in designing  standards
and guidelines that might be used by a self-regulatory  agency or by an official agency.
Security and Costs.  Security  should  always  be  proportional  to  the  real  value  of the
underlying  transaction.  Given  this  proviso,  it  appears  that when  transaction  value  is  small,  no
clear  economic  or  risk-management  case  can  be  made  for employing  the  most  sophisticated
electronic  security regimes  when a less expensive form of security will yield the same return. For
example,  a  financial  services  provider  would  not  want  to  use an  expensive  and  cumbersome
authentication  process, such as public key infrastructure  (PKI), for small-value transactions when
tokens or other simpler  forms of authentication  will mitigate the risk of theft,  and so on, to an
acceptable  level.
Security and Quality of Service.  Similarly,  trade-offs exist  between  the  convenience  or
quality of service, as computed  in terms of speed  and the extent and degree to which  security is
used. The more complex the  security process  used, such as PKI, the longer  the transaction  takes
to be completed.  Advances in these technologies  are lessening this trade-off. Over time, effective
authentication  or encryption systems will be available that do not slow the speed of transactions
and  do not  disparage  the  quality  of service.  Moreover,  one  can  argue  that  confidence  in the
security of services is an essential aspect of quality in providing financial services.
Security and Technological Innovation. For electronic  security systems to be effective,  it
is  important  to  ensure  that  private  parties  agree  to  certain  standards  and  guidelines.  But  the
proliferation  of technologies  that  can be  used  to  transmit  information  and  their  rapid rate  of
integration  inherently  creates  a  reluctance  to  adopt  standards  or  guidelines.  Technological
innovation can be stifled and customer service can  suffer if security  standards are not sufficiently
flexible  and  technology-neutral.  As  will  be  noted  in  later  sections,  even  the  definition  of an
electronic  signature needs to be very carefully designed so as not to preempt the use of a number
of alternative  technologies.  In other words,  the concept of technology neutrality  is an  important
one to adopt when formulating legislation and regulation. (See Section VI.)
Security and Privacy. Ironically,  the  need  for more  effective  electronic  security  may
sometimes conflict with and negatively affect the user's privacy.  Inadvertently, it may also affect
the privacy of third parties who are identified  in affected information. This tension is natural, and
it is not new. On the one hand, certain types of electronic security services may be consistent with
protecting privacy  (e.g.,  programs  such  as cyber  patrol).  On  the  other hand,  security  may be
needed to track and verify the user's movements.  In other cases,  however, the person undertaking
the transaction  may want  to remain  anonymous  as part of a  trading  strategy.  Developing  the
proper balance  between  security  and privacy  is  a  delicate  matter.  It often  is decided  within  a
cultural paradigm.  Sometimes  this means  that something  considered  private  in one  culture  may
not  be  deemed  so  in  another.  Moreover,  the  laws  (e.g.,  bank  secrecy  provisions)  often
compromise the ability of the authorities to investigate properly and take enforcement  actions in
complex electronic crime cases.
The Pillars  of an Overall Framework
This paper is built on the concept that trust and confidence of market participants  is a key
component of a robust economy. Given this assumption, seven fundamental pillars are needed to
sustain a framework of reform and to improve the security of the market. These are
18*  An adequate legal and enforcement framework in certain critical areas.
*  Adequate  treatment of electronic  security  in the case of payments services and those that
undertake to provide  e-enabling services  to  financial  services providers,  such  as money
transmitters.
*  An effective  supervision and prevention  regime to manage emerging  electronic  security
requirements.
*  Public partnerships with private insurance companies to monitor the efficacy of security
systems  on  a  macro  level  and  promote  the  development  of minimum  standards  for
electronic security.
*  Public partnerships with private entities to develop and adopt transactional  security levels
for transactional  information  and electronic  signatures,  together with criteria  to  protect
document and data classification standards.
*  Public  partnerships  with  private  entities  to  develop  and  maintain  accurate  incident
databases and a related reporting framework for electronic  security incidents to be used in
assessing systemic risk over time.
*  Public  education  about  how technological  change  and  related  electronic  security  risks
need to be addressed.
Issues  usually arise in each of the  areas identified  above when the  challenges posed by
electronic  security  are addressed  in  a more  systemic  manner.  The  sections  that follow  explore
each of these pillars.
V.  Pillar I: Legal Framework and Enforcement20
Laws, Policies, and  Practices  Bearing on Electronic Security
Countries  adopting electronic  financial  services  should  address  and incorporate  security
concerns  as they develop  policies,  laws, and regulations.  In this way, they can build a security
framework  that will support the  safe and sound operation of their institutions  and combat  crime
and cyber  terrorism.  The  following  areas of law,  at a minimum,  should be included  in any  e-
finance legal framework:
*  Electronic transactions and commerce law
*  Payment systems security law
*  Privacy law
*  Cyber crime law
*  Anti-money laundering law
These  five  categories  of law  address  the  basic relationships and transactional  activity
that flow through the e-payments system.
The cornerstone  of an e-finance  legal  framework is recognition of the legal  validity of
electronic  signatures,  transactions,  or  records.  Further,  these  laws  should  prefer  technology-
neutral  solutions,  provide  basic  consumer  protections  for  electronically  based  transactions,
promote  interoperability,  and  address  records  retention.  Two  basic  models  exist:  the  act
developed  by  the  United  Nations  Commission  on  International  Trade  Law,  titled
UNCr1RAL,  and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA).  An electronic commerce law
20 The authors thank Edward Gilbride, Counsel for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,  for very helpful written
inputs in the context of the discussion  in this section.
19might  address  all non-consumer-related  financial  transactions  and  records.  It  should  focus  on
governing  conduct  with consumers  and  on  basic  financial  payment  mechanisms  such  as  EDI,
EBT, EFT, and ETC. Specifically, it defines what constitutes a secure financial services system in
an open network architecture and requires entities to practice due diligence.
Electronic Transactions and  Commerce Law:  The  past  seven  years  have  produced
tremendous  growth  in  electronic-commerce-related  legislation.  In  1995,  only  a  handful  of
countries  had  basic  computer  or intellectual  property  laws.  Today,  almost  every  country  has
enacted an electronic signature or electronic transaction  act. The basic elements of these laws are
the same, with minor variations. Most of the laws use UETA, promulgated in the United States by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), or UNCrTRAL.
Significant  differences  exist  in  the  provisions  of  UETA  and  UNC1TRAL,  but  the
objectives  of both are  the  same:  to  promote  electronic  commerce  and  to ensure  that electronic
signatures,  however  they  may  be  defined,  have  the  same  effect  under  the  law  as  manual
signatures. For example, UETA defines  an  electronic signature  as "an electronic  sound,  symbol,
or process  attached to or logically associated with a record and executed  or adopted by a person
with  the  intent  to  sign  the  record."  UNCITRAL  defines  an  electronic  signature  as  "data  in
electronic form in, affixed to, or logically associated with a data message, which may be used to
identify the signatory in relation to the data message  and indicate the signatory's approval  of the
information  contained in the data message."  Each provides  a different  perspective  on timing and
intent. UETA presumes that by signing the document,  the signer intends to be legally bound.  Its
wording creates  a presumption  in  favor of the validity of the contract.  UNCITRAL,  in contrast,
uses permissive  language,  creating  no  presumption  in  favor  of the  contract.  Further  it  should
address the issues of record management and record retention.
With  the proliferation  of electronic  signature  and electronic  transaction  legislation  over
the  past decade,  electronic  commerce  has  come into  its own  legally.  In general,  an  electronic
signature  has  the same  force  and effect  as a manual  signature  in most of the world.  The latest
country to adopt electronic  signatures was Russia, which enacted its Electronic Digital  Signature
Law on January  16, 2002. Typically,  the law changes significantly more slowly than many other
parts of a culture.  The law appears, though, to be trying to adapt to electronic commerce needs as
quickly  as  the  world  is  coming  online.  This  is  a  major  phenomenon  that  raises  issues  of
importance beyond the scope of this paper.
Payment Systems Security Laws. Though most countries have  laws in place  to regulate
different  components  of the payments  system, no country  has yet addressed  payments  systems
issues  comprehensively.  Payment systems  legislation  should identify,  license,  and regulate  any
directly related payment system entities,  such as money transmitters  and ISPs. It should require
such elements to operate  in a safe and sound manner so as to protect the integrity and reliability
of the  system.  It  should  require  the  timely  and  accurate  reporting  of all  security  incidents,
including  all electronically  related money  losses.  Finally,  it should  require  all  payment  system
entities to adhere  to a documented  security  program and should encourage  some form of shared
risk protection.
Privacy Laws.  Clearly,  privacy  is  an  area of the  law that  is  undergoing  considerable
scrutiny  throughout  the  world.  It  is  an  issue  of  fundamental  importance,  reflecting  the  very
substance  of our cultural identities,  values,  and mores,  and it must be  handled with the utmost
care. Poorly considered decisions made in this arena may haunt us for years to come.
20On  the  issue  of privacy  protection,  some  countries  have  chosen  to  legislate  on  a
functional  or  piecemeal  basis,  while  others  have  taken a more  encompassing,  process-oriented
approach.  Two  approaches  are also  being used on the  issue of consent.  The first is  to assume
consent unless the party affirmatively  chooses not to have the information  sold or used for other
purposes.  The second is to assume that the party has not consented  to any use of the information
unless the party gives that consent. The United States follows the first approach in both areas. The
European  Union  (EU)  exemplifies  the  second  in  each  area  and  continues  to  be  the  leader  in
providing privacy protection to its citizens with its 1990 EU Directive on Data Collection.
No matter which approach is used, at a minimum, privacy  laws should embrace the Fair
Information  Practice  Principles  of notice,  choice,  access,  and  security.  They  should  address
privacy rights conceming any data collected, stored, or used by an entity for different purposes, in
particular those  uses that could affect a person's basic  human rights,  such as criminal,  financial,
business,  or medical  uses.  In practice,  privacy  laws would  require  entities  to  do the following:
advise persons  about how data will be used; collect  only the minimum  data needed  to complete
the transaction or record at issue; use the data only for those purposes that it advised the person it
would be used for; and permit persons to view any information collected and dispute the validity
of any  such information with  timely corrections.  Finally,  the law  should  impose restrictions  on
any entity collecting, holding, or disclosing information in a form that would allow identification
of the person it relates to, however that may be defined.
In practice  privacy  laws  would require  information  gathering  entities  to  advise  persons
from where they are collecting the information and how the data will be used.2'
Cyber-Crime Laws.  Significant  debate  is  transpiring  in  legal  communities  worldwide
over  the  impact  of cyber  crime  on  fundamental  concepts  of law,  such  as jurisdiction,  and  in
particular  on how the electronic  culture is changing traditional  paradigms.  Financial  cyber crime
is a top priority  in this  dialogue  because,  more often  than not, it requires  intense  intemational
cooperation  among  what  can  be  an  overwhelming  number  of law  enforcement  agencies  and
regulators from different countries.  Because no country is immune,  every country should benefit
from pooling resources  to address this problem.  But, more than any other aspect of computer law,
financial  cyber  crime  tests  the  continuing  validity  of  the  industrial  regulatory  and  law
enforcement  model.  Because  of the  underlying  complexity of such  cases  and  the  overlapping
jurisdictions of authority within a country,  one of the first things  the laws should address is who
or what has authority and responsibility for these cases. A significant cost avoidance  could result
from such reform,  and money  saved could be invested  in trained resource experts and the tools
needed  to  investigate,  prosecute,  and punish  cyber-crime  perpetrators.  Substantively,  the  laws
should address abuses of a computer or network that result in loss or destruction to the computer,
the network, or people, and should include provisions for restitution for associated losses.22
A December  2000  McConnell  Intemational  survey provides  a snapshot  of the  state of
computer  crime  legislation  worldwide.  It  examined  the  legal  frameworks  of 52  countries  to
determine each one's ability to prosecute perpetrators of 10 types of computer crime. The survey
21  This data should be used only for those purposed that were interded. They should also permit the persons from
whom they collected  the information to view it and provide a process by which,such persons  could dispute the validity.
22 The United States has enacted various  comnputer intrusion laws that treat identity theft and computer-initiated  fraud
as criminal offenses with severe penalties.  Recent legislation grants individual banks  the power to freeze  customer
accounts if criminal activity is suspected. Penalties  for fraud and related activities perpetrated  in connection with
computers  can include imprisonment of up to 25 years (see http://www.cvbercrime.gov/cclaws.htmlI.
21showed that a patchwork of outdated and inconsistent  laws effectively  functions  as a shield  from
prosecution for cyber criminals who attack electronic systems and information.23
For countries looking to develop cyber-crime  legislation, the Council of Europe provides
some  guidance.  In 2001,  it developed  the first international  treaty on crimes  committed via the
Internet  and  other  computer  networks,  dealing  particularly  with  infringements  of copyright,
computer-related  fraud,  child  pornography,  and  violations  of network  security.  The treaty  also
provides  for a  series  of powers  and  procedures,  such  as the  search  of computer  networks  and
interception.24
Anti-Money Laundering  Laws. Worldwide,  money-laundering is recognized as one of the
most potent forces threatening  political and economic stability.  Since  1990, the Financial Action
Task Force  (FATF)  has spearheaded  the  adoption and  implementation  of measures  designed  to
counter  the  use  of  the  financial  system  by  criminals  (see  http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/).  It
established  40  recommendations  that  set  out  the  basic  framework  for  anti-money  laundering
efforts  and are  intended  to be of universal  application.  In  1996,  the FATF recognized  the  link
between  cyber vulnerabilities  and  money  laundering  when  it modified  its  40 recommendations
1996  to  include  number  13,  which  states,  "Countries  should  pay  special  attention  to  money
laundering  threats  inherent in new  or developing  technologies  that might favor  anonymity,  and
take  measures,  if needed,  to  prevent  their  use  in  money  laundering  schemes."  The  points
addressed  in cyber-crime  laws  also  apply here.  Substantively,  at a minimum,  these laws should
define  money  laundering  and  should  commit  to international  cooperation  in  the  investigation,
prosecution, and punishment of such crimes pursuant to the guidance provided by the FATF. The
FATF  regularly  reviews  its  members  for  compliance  with  the  40 recommendations,  with  the
result that the recommendations are now the principal standard in this field.
Enforcement  Powers
The  ability  to  enforce  the  laws  and  regulations  within  and  across  boundaries  is  as
important  as providing  an  adequate  legal  and  regulatory  framework  within which  to prosecute
perpetrators  and penalize  those entities  operating  in an unsafe and  unsound manner.  To achieve
enforcement,  many countries need to take a number of critical steps.
Regulatory enforcement reforms should address, at a minimum, varying degrees of cease-
and-desist  orders  and compliance  actions.  Cease-and-desist  orders  could range  from removal  of
the entity from the online system until it comes into compliance to closing the entity down. While
a financial  services  provider may not  have  access to online  activity,  it still may  be conducting
unsafe and unsound operations to such an extent that it is jeopardizing other entities.
Without  a  concerted  international  cooperative  effort,  e-finance  hackers  will  commonly
move to jurisdictions with the most lax legal and enforcement frameworks.
Access,  availability,  and  interoperability  should  be  the  mantra  to  guide  financial
supervision  and enforcement efforts.  The traditional  regulatory structure must expand to include
all entities directly related to the delivery of financial  services.  This entails everything from ISPs
to ASPs, software and hardware vendors, and security providers.
Legislation needs to incorporate  these providers into the regulatory and enforcement net.
Moreover, professional  liability needs to attach to these providers,  to the  directors who contract
23  See http://www.mcconnellintemational.com/services/securitylaw,roject.cfm
24 See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/I  85.htm).
22with them, and to the lawyers and accountants  who provide  services  to them because,  in-the new
paradigm,  all  are  indispensable  to  the  institution's  ability  to provide  financial  services.  One
approach  might require that these providers be bonded,  licensed,  and subject to periodic  audits
and  examination  under  the  appropriate  regulatory  scheme.  This  would create  a  relevant  basis
from which  to undertake  enforcement  actions.  As stated  already,  traditional  regulatory  schemes
are outdated,  and as currently configured  they cannot adequately address the new components  of
the payments system to determine whether a financial institution is operating in a secure manner.
VI.  Pillar II. Electronic  Security of Payment Systems
Money  Transmitters: Background
Convergence  and integration  are the keys  to the revolution  in money movement  and to
wholesale  and retail payments  services.  Convergence  of the telecommunications,  computer,  and
financial  services  industries  is  changing  the  fundamentals  of  industrial  organization  in  the
financial  services  sector,  as  noted  in  Section  mI,  redefining  traditional  boundaries  and
jurisdictional limits of responsibility  because  of shifting legal, regulatory,  and financial concepts.
The  industrial  age  gave  rise  to  certain  agreed-upon  regulatory  concepts  by  which  the
telecommunications  and financial services  industries operated.  Regulation of telecommunications
was based on public  safety, interest,  and welfare through the use of universal  access  and service.
The regulation  of banking was based  on safety and  soundness  with nondiscriminatory  access  to
credit  opportunities.  Convergence,  however,  requires  reassessment  of this regulatory  paradigm
because of the necessity for universal access in a safe and sound environment.
Convergence  and  integration  help  realize  the  telecommunication  and  financial  services
goals of access,  availability, and interoperability.  Access to the financial system was once limited
to  a  few  complex  protocols.  Now  anyone  can  access  the  system  using  microwave,  wireless,
satellite, public switched network (PSN),  computer, IP telephony,  interactive television, ATM, or
brick-and-mortar  structures.  In  addition,  these  advances  have redefined  and  eliminated  time  so
that  the  financial  system  is  accessible  to  anyone,  anytime,  anywhere,  using  cash,  debit  card,
check,  credit  card,  stored  value  card,  or  smart  card.  Money  is  now  interoperable,  as
telecommunications  and computers  facilitate  the conversion  from one currency to another simply
by  the  push  of a  button.  Eventually,  even  the  servers  of a  telecommunications  company,  in
addition to  facilitating  cellular  calls, will  be used  for effecting  payments  between  prepaid  cell
phone subscribers.
Under this new industrial structure, and given the increased outsourcing of operations, the
following  questions  about the design of regulations  seem reasonable:  Who  or what  is a money
transmitter?  What  is  an  ISP?  Should  the  regulatory  framework  deal  only  with  core  financial
activities,  or should it include outsourcing entities? If it increases,  what is the case for regulating
these  entities,  and  what  agencies  need  to  play  a  role  or  have  ultimate  responsibility?  Such
fundamental  questions must be answered  to create effective  incentives for money transmitters and
ISPs to adopt adequate electronic security.  The regulatory objective must be clear and simple.
Who  or what  is a  money  transmitter? Today,  the  set  of entities  involved  in  money
transmission or payments  is more difficult to define than one might expect.  These entities are not
well regulated  or supervised  in many countries,  even if they can be  defined.  For the purposes  of
this paper,  a  money transmitter  is  any  commercial  enterprise  that  engages  in the transfer  and
exchange of monetary instruments and currency.
23Money transmitters  may perform  a variety of services,  including money order issuance,
wire transfers, currency exchanges,  check-cashing,  and check-presentment.  More recently, money
transmitters have been providing electronic  check-presentment  services and point-of-sale  money
payment  order  information  to  the  accepting  bank.  Money  transmitters  operate  outside  the
depository  institution  but are  often  are  associated  in  some  way  with  one  or  more  depository
institutions in a downstream relationship.
What is an ISP? Whether an entity is an ISP can be difficult to determine  under existing
law. ISPs are not regulated  in most countries,  and countries that have tried to regulate  them have
experienced significant backlash. One recent example involved Australia's Broadcasting  Services
Amendment  (Online Services) Act  1999, referred to by its critics, who claim it is overly broad, as
the Internet Censorship Act.  It has received intemational  attention and is touted  as an attempt by
one  country  to  impose  a censorship  regime  on  the  Intemet.25 A number  of entities,  including
financial  services providers, could fall under its definition of an ISP.
This paper  suggests  that  analysis  of the payment  system  at  large  shows  that  hosting
companies/ISPs  have become  a critical sector  and can have a direct impact on the security of an
institution.  As  an example,  the use  of multiple  channels  to distribute  financial  services  or make
payments has expanded the circle of providers to include a Web site hosting service,  a third-party
software developer to plan and implement the Web site, application software or service providers,
a  third-party  processor  to  facilitate  information  movement  from the  Web  site  to  the  financial
institution's network,  a customer service call center,  and one or more ISPs or money transmitters.
Use of these new  channels  means  that the  financial  services  sector  now broadcasts;  publishes;
provides  or  uses  e-mail,  Intemet  services,  network  services,  and  entertainment;  hosts  online
forums; and uses bulletin boards.  As the nondepository institutions involved become more varied,
defining who is a money transmitter becomes more complex and requires  a two-part test. First, to
what extent  is  an institution relying  on that provider to transact and  deliver  financial  services?
Second,  to what extent can the provider have an impact on the payment system?
The  expansion  of the  types  of entities  involved  in  money  transmission  creates  both
greater  opportunities  and more complex  liabilities  and responsibilities.  Converging  technologies
have opened access to the payment systems. Disintermediation of the financial services sector has
created an open competitive  environment  to all aspects of the payments system.  Open access  has
resulted  in  the  proliferation  of money transmitters  and  their  partnering  with  ISPs.  With  these
developments, challenges have increased  for electronic security of payments.
Safety and  Soundness  for Money Transmitters  and ISPs
The  question  of how  to ensure  safety  and  soundness  in  the  case  of ISPs  and money
transmitters must address at least five basic, generic problems:
1.  Lack of definition
2.  Lack of reporting requirements
3.  Limited or no regulation
4.  Limited or no warranties, indemnification,  and liabilities
5.  Lack of security as a necessary element for service providers
25  The Online Services Act defines an ISP as anyone who provides an Intemet carriage service that is used for (a) the
carriage of informnation between  two end-users outside the "inmmediate  circle" of the supplier, as defined in the
Commonwealth  Telecommunications  Act of 1997-and when one person uses an Internet carriage service to view the
content of a second person (e.g., by visiting a Web site), both of these people would be considered  end-users of that
carriage service; or (b) the carriage of information  simultaneously to more than one end-user, at least one of  whom is
outside the inmmediate circle of the supplier.
24Toward a Working Definition of  a Money Transmitter
Money  transmitters  are  often  referred  to  as  nonbank  financial  institutions  or  money
services  businesses.  Numerous  definitions  exist  for  this  payments  system  "service"  sector.
Generally  speaking,  and  for  the  purposes  of this  paper,  money  transmitters  are  commercial
enterprises  engaged  in the  transfer and  exchange  of monetary  instruments  and currency.  In the
context  of  electronic  payment  systems,  they  typically  serve  as  third-party  automated
clearinghouse (ACH) providers.
Money transmitters  do not operate  alone. They require  access to telecommunications  to
transport information from point to point.  Usually a  money transmitter contracts  with an ISP to
transport the information across network lines.
Failure  to require  reporting  or to review  and expand  regulations  to  include  new money
movement  vehicles  permits  unsafe  and  unsound  activities  to  use  the  payment  system  without
check  or  prevention.  Legislation  should  place  an  affirmative  duty  on  executives  to  report
incidents, and the intentional failure to report should carry potential punishment.
Liability of  Money Transmitters
The money transmitter-ISP  venture is usually structured as a layered relationship built on
successive  contracts,  each  containing  no  or  limited  liability.  The  money  transmitter  provides
database  software  to  the  end-user  that typically  has  limited  or  no warranties,  and  the  money
transmitter carries  limited or no liability  for providing the software  or access.  The ISP typically
leases  a  number  of telephone  lines  or  telecommunications  resources  at  a  certain  rate.  The
underlying service contract with the telecommunications provider is solely for leased space on the
network.  The network provider,  typically  one of the large public  switched  companies, provides
only a transport mechanism.  This  arrangement  is similar to right-of-way agreements  for utilities
or trains that allow use along  the track but do not include  access to the track.  The ISP  contracts
with the money transmitter for cost-plus as a transport mechanism only, again incurring limited or
no liability for this service.
The ISP may  enter into  a service-level  agreement  (SLA)  with the  user (i.e.,  the money
transmitter).  Industry  standard norms  require that the telecommunications  system be  operational
at least 99.5 percent of the time during the service contract.  The contract contains  a formula  for
determining  an appropriate refund mechanism dependent on the number of times/amount of time
access falls below the service level. The money transmitter in turn assumes no liability, or limited
liability,  to the user. The money transmitter provides no additional value  in the form of security
for its  service;  it simply provides  a  type of bundled service  to the user.  In essence,  the money
transmitter charges a convenience  fee. The user simply uses the money transmitter's  software to
create and store the payment order data, which it then sends on a periodic basis to a clearinghouse
for deposit or credit to the user's account after it has wound its way through the payments system.
Money  transmitters  and  ISPs  that  provide  services  to  the  financial  sector  should  be
required by regulation  or legislation  to provide  liability.  Sharing  risk is a proven  model  in the
financial  services arena, and there is as yet no evidence that this would increase  the basic service
cost.  In  fact,  only when  service  entities  are  required  to  report  losses  or  suspected  losses  can
sufficient  information  be  garnered  to  improve  pricing  for  e-security  bonds  and  e-commerce
liability insurance.
25Lack of a Well-Organized  Regulatory Frameworkfor Money Transmitters
Until  January  2002,  money transmitters  in the  United  States  were  not regulated  at the
federal  level.  However,  they  are  coming  under  increased  scrutiny,  because  there  are  now  an
estimated  200,000  money  transmitters  operating  in  the  United  States  and  the  evidence  is
mounting  that  some  are being used  to launder  money.  In  its  1998-99  annual report,  the FATF
noted  a growing  trend to use nonfinancial  professional  service providers as conduits  for money
laundering  and other nefarious  activities.  Box 4  outlines how money-laundering  concerns have
triggered the need to regulate money transmitters in the United States.
As  a  result  of the  lack  of standardization  in  regulation  and  oversight,  many  money
transmitters insert significant risk into the payments  system. Typically, they are undercapitalized,
use  little  or  no  risk-management  analysis,  and  are  extremely  susceptible  to bankruptcy  and
failure.  With  the  escalation  of Internet-related  commercial  activities  and the  requisite  need  to
provide  ubiquitous  payment  system  conduits,  money  transmitters  are  increasing  the
disintermediation  of the traditional  payments systems and have a higher profile in the eyes of law
enforcement.
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Because  the primary  focus of legislative  initiatives targeting money transmitters  has been
to deter money laundering, most of the activity affecting this industry is derived from anti-money
laundering  sources.26
Two efforts stand out:
I.  The Uniform  Money Services  Act,  adopted by the NCCUSL  in 2000 and known  as
the  Money  Transmitters  Act.27 The  act  requires  a money  transmitter  to obtain  a
license to operate;  sets forth certain licensing  criteria,  enforcement,  and compliance
provisions;  makes  a statement  on jurisdiction;  and includes provisions  on the scope
of the  act  and  audit  and  examination  authority.  It  also  contains  bond provisions,
minimum net worth criteria, provisions on management experience, and requirements
that  the  money  transmitter  disclose  prior  litigation  and  criminal  prosecution  of
management.  Only seven states have adopted the act.
2 6 See Section  V for additional  information  on money laundering.
27  See www.law.uRenn.edu/bll/ulc/monevservfUMSA200IFinal.htm
262.  The  MRTA  Act,  created  by  the  Money  Transmitters  Regulators  Association
(MRTA),  formed  in  1989  as  a  state  regulators  organization.  Though  not  as
comprehensive  as NCCUSL's Money Transmitters  Act, it  is still  a model for dealing
with  the  licensing  and  regulation  of money  transmitters.  Only  five  states  have
adopted it.
Because  so  few  states  have  adopted  these  acts,  the  United  States  is  left  with  an
inconsistent,  tedious,  and  inadequate  regulatory  scheme.  Nevertheless,  those  states  that  have
shown  foresight  and  initiative  in  adopting  these  laws  should  be  able  to  collect badly  needed
information  on  this  industry  and  provide  a  nucleus  from  which  better  regulation  can  emerge.
More  exploration  is needed  to  locate  the  various  money  transmission  channels  and  regulatory
approaches  other  countries  have  used.  When  this  paper went  to press,  none  had  been  located,
indicating that emerging markets are not treating these issues systematically.
The last and most promising  regulatory  effort is enactment  of the  Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 2001. This act affects the future definition of financial  services in the United States in the
following three ways:
First, the Federal  ReservelBoard (the Fed)  is required to  determine  what is "financial  in
nature,"  taking  into account the purposes  of both  this act  and the Bank Holding  Company  Act;
changes  in  the  market  and  in  technology;  and  an  assessment  of whether  any  new  activity  is
necessary  or appropriate  to compete,  to deliver  services  efficiently,  and to  offer customers  new
means of obtaining services.
Second, the Fed is required to decide whether, and to what extent, the following activities
are financial in nature or are incidental to a financial  activity:
*  Lending,  exchanging,  transferring,  investing for others,  or safeguarding  financial  assets
other than money and securities.
*  Providing devices or means for transferring money or other financial assets.
*  Arranging,  effecting, and facilitating financial transactions for the account of others.
Third, the Fed may determine  that an activity is complementary to a financial activity and
by  order  or  regulation  deem  that  activity  to  be  permissible  for  a  financial  services  holding
company.
The Fed has not initiated rules in any of the required or permissive areas. Nevertheless,
this act has positioned  the Fed to guide the expansion of regulation  to include  money transmitters
and  ISPs  or any  other  entity  that  enables  financial  institutions  to  provide  services.  Thus,  the
opportunity  and  the need  now exist to  initiate  global  financial  forums  that  call for harmonized
approaches  to these and other issues raised by the presence of the new market.
Security  for Services Provided
ISPs  and  money  transmitters  do  not  necessarily  provide  additional  security  for  their
services.  If either  is  able  to  offer  security,  the  provider  will  distinguish  between  secure  and
unsecured services.  A money transmitter called  SWIFT, for example,  is careful to distinguish that
it provides secure EDI service only. Until a few years ago, SWIFT was a closed system. Today, it
has  access  points  to  the  public  switched  network.  It  continues  to  be  one  of the  most  secure
transport mechanisms  available  in the  global payments  system. FEDWIRE is another example  of
a  closed  system,  but  it now  is  also  connected  to  the  Internet  and  is  subject  to  vulnerability.
27Lacking sufficient terms and conditions in the contract, a user has no way of knowing whether or
to what extent an ISP or money transmitter provides security.
Great Britain passed legislation in 2000  that allows the govemment  to track e-mails  and
seize  encrypted  Internet  communications.  It  enables  law  enforcement  authorities  to  demand
records of Internet traffic  and to view the content of encrypted  messages. ISPs are required  to set
up  secure  channels  to  connect  to the  Govemment  Technical  Assistance  Center.  In  tum,  the
govemment  contributed $30  million to ISPs to cover the cost of installing the "black box" link to
the Ml 5 Technical Assistance  Spy Center.
Actions to Improve Electronic  Security of  Payment  Systems
The most important objective in a convergent  technology  environment is to mitigate risk
to the extent possible in using an open, universal access architecture. This places  greater emphasis
on identifying  and  analyzing systemic risks and vulnerabilities,  eliminating  risks where feasible,
and continually  monitoring both risks and security.  Few  emerging  markets  appear to have  dealt
with these issues explicitly thus far. This poses the question of how to do more with less but still
increase security and privacy.
In  reality, the payment  system has broadened  and deepened,  becoming  far more porous
and  vulnerable.  A  system  is- only  as  secure  as  its  weakest  link.  Therefore,  the  first  defense
recommendation  is  to  enact  legislation  regulating  all  money  transmitters  and  any  ISPs  that
provide service to the financial services  sector, requiring them to be secure. The Uniform Money
Services Business Act would be a good basis for regulating these providers.
Another approach  would be to use a request for proposal (RFP) process to shop  for value
and negotiate  the needed terms and conditions  in selecting  providers.  It is important  to build in a
service-level  agreement  with  appropriate  refund  mechanisms,  liability,  and  warranties  to  the
terms and conditions.
At present,  signing onto the Internet via an ISP results in an adhesion contract  in which
the  vendor  dictates  all  terms  and  conditions.  The  industry  refers  to  such  contracts  as  "User
Agreements"  or "Access Agreements."  The contracts  are posted  on the  Internet,  and  one  either
accepts the terms and conditions as set forth or does not use the service. Typically,  such contracts
require the user to check the Intemet site periodically for any contract  changes, and continued use
of the  service  constitutes  acceptance  of  the  terms  and  conditions.  Adhesion  contracts,  once
considered unenforceable,  are becoming the norm  in the ISP and electronic-commerce-dominated
industries, especially  the financial  services industries.
Another  avenue  of  defense  is  self-regulation  through  the  automated  clearinghouse
process  or,  more broadly,  via specific  arrangements  outlining  security  standards  in the  case  of
wholesale  or retail payment  networks.  Building clearinghouse  rules requiring  all entities  to  use
vendors  that  provide  an  appropriate  level  of security  and to post sufficient  money  or bond  to
cover losses  would  create  an  incentive  for  the parties  to establish  a proper  electronic  security
standard.  This approach  needs  to figure  more prominently  in  the ongoing  work  of establishing
wholesale  and  retail  payment  networks  in  emerging  markets.  Moreover,  as  in  the  case  of
securities regulation,  central bank supervision of SROs that are responsible for retail or wholesale
payments will become far more important.
Insurance coverage  is yet another means of protection.  Financial services entities  should  use
insurance  to protect  themselves  from  gap loss,  whereby  e-risk  is realized  even  after  insurance
28companies have required a financial services provider to meet specific security standards. Section
VIII will examine this issue in more detail.
VII.  Pillar III: Supervision and Prevention Challenges
Background: Electronic Security and E-Banking Supervision
In  1999, the Basel  Committee  established the Electronic  Banking  Group (EBG) to focus
on  adapting  the  Basel  Committee  Guidance  as  necessary  to  e-banking  issues.  Moreover,  the
Financial  Stability  Forum  (FSF)  has  established  a  special  overall  contact group  that  is in  the
process of discussing what issues need to be addressed in the implementation  of the 14 principles
identified by the EBG (see Box 5).
Because e-banking  is based on technology  designed to  expand the "virtual"  geographic
reach  of  banks  and  customers  without  necessarily  requiring  a  physical  expansion,  market
expansion beyond national borders significantly increases cross-border supervision challenges for
bank supervisors.  Although  such  supervisors  agree that the  supervisory principles  of traditional
banking are applicable to e-banking, changes  in technology  and dependence by banks  on service
providers magnify the level of risk. The 14 principles for risk management of e-banking issued by
the EBG  fall  into three  fundamental  categories:  (1)  effective  board  and management  oversight,
(2) security risk issues, and (3) reputation risk issues.
The ability of regulatory agencies to regulate  and supervise e-banking entities effectively
in today's virtual banking environment must be strengthened to handle the special challenges  of
electronic  security.  Authentication,  security  control,  integrity,  and  even  incident  response
planning  figure  prominently  in  the  14  EBG  principles.  In particular,  the  EBG  emphasizes  the
need for a bank's effective  internal controls.  Moreover,  the EBG principles place liability on the
banks in the event of electronic  security problems  with vendors.  Despite  this emphasis,  there is
still a need to make the chain of vendors involved in the delivery of electronic  security services or
other e-enabling services secure and to impose better downstream liability on these entities.
In  many  countries,  a bank  is  subject  to  examination  on a  periodic  basis.  In  the  past,
traditional  examinations  were  done  on-site  and  based  on  safety  and  soundness  through  the
CAMEL rating system.28 In addition, banks in most countries throughout the world are subject to
some variant (where weights may differ) of the Basel capital adequacy guidelines. The challenges
presented by electronic  security breaches  are not explicitly accounted for in this framework  and,
as noted  below,  even  the  present  capital  standards  do not  really  address  this  form  of risk  in
particular.
28 Capital Assets Management Equity and Liquidity (CAMEL)  is a system that is based on a ranking of one to five,
with one being the best.
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Bank Capital  Standards and  E-Security
In  May  2001,  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  issued  a  consultative
document relating to capital adequacy regulations. This document defines operational  risk as the
"risk  of direct  or  indirect  loss resulting  from  inadequate  or  failed  internal  processes,  people,
systems, and external  events."29 It identifies three ways to measure operational  risk: (1) the basic
indicator  approach,  (2)  the  standardized  approach,  and  (3)  the  internal  management  approach.
Under the basic indicator approach, banks have to hold capital for operational risk that is equal to
a  fixed percentage  of gross income.  In the  case of the standardized  approach,  a more  complex
process  is  used  whereby  the  financial  services  provider  breaks  up  its  overall  operations  into
distinct business lines and uses different  indicators for each and then computes the capital charge
29 See Basel Commnittee on Banking Supervision Consultative  Document: The New Basel  Accord,  January 2001.
30via use of a capital  factor provided  by supervisors.  Finally, the most  advanced  approach is the
internal measurement approach, which relies on calculations that result in expected losses.
None  of  these  frameworks  allows  for  what  one  might  think  of as  kidnapping-  or
extortion-related  risks  caused  by  penetration  of a  bank's  systems.  Moreover,  the  concept  of
operational  risk that  is now used  addresses  only  legal  risk,  not the  problems  of strategic  and
reputation  risks.  Since  incentives  to  report  losses  or compromises  of the system accurately  are
often lacking,  taking proper account of electronic security risks in any concept of operational risk
will be highly subjective and complex.
E-Security and ITExamination Processes
What, then, is the best way forward  if capital  regulations  cannot be adjusted?  One of the
most fruitful avenues is to publicize the actions that can be taken to measure and manage the risk
of electronic  security  breaches.  Implementing  new  guidelines  and risk-management  processes
that can be  monitored by bank  examiners  would  impose  a minimum  standard for dealing with
electronic  security  because it  could reduce  the prospect  of security  breaches.  Here,  adoption  of
some form of layered electronic security risk protocol might also be worthy of consideration.  Box
6, which  draws  on  extensive  consultations  with  electronic  security  industry experts,  illustrates
such a.  set of layered  security measures  (see also Annex I, which contains more detail).  A bank
could have many of these layers of security in place. A number of these actions are not costly to
implement with any financial services provider, yet they are often lacking.
In  recent  years,  IT  examinations  have  been  performed  on  banks  that possess  online
transactional  banling  systems.  IT  examiners  would  often  enter  a bank and  ask the  following
questions:
1.  Do you have a firewall?
2.  If so, is it configured properly?
3.  Do you possess  a local  area  network  (LAN) or wide  area network  (WAN)?  If so, are
there encrypted  channels?
Recently,  a number  of countries,  including  the United  States,  have passed  legislation
stipulating the need for financial  services providers to strengthen  their information  security.  For
example,  the GLBA, also known as the Financial  Services Modernization Act or Title V 12 CFR
573, applies to "financial  institutions." These are defined very broadly in Section 509(3) of the act
to  mean  '!any  institution the business  of which  is  engaging  in  financial  activities  described  in
section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Act of 1956."  GLBA states that these institutions must adhere to
the following actions:
*  Identify and assess the risks that may threaten customer information.
*  Develop a written plan containing  policies and procedures  to manage  and  control these
risks.
*  Implement and test the plan.
*  Adjust the plan on a continuing basis to account for changes in technology, the sensitivity
of customer information, and internal or external threats to information security.
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Essentially,  GLBA  addressed  the  pivotal  question,  "What  is  being  done  to  secure
customer data, both physical and electronic in origin?" Although it is a step in the right direction,
this law needs improvement vis-a-vis the specifics as to how banks should protect their electronic
assets.  An underlying  tension exists within the banking community between whether to spell out
how to secure IT systems or whether to even make the effort because of the ever-changing nature
of technology  and the multitude  of acceptable  ways  to  secure  electronic  banking  systems.  The
1996  Federal Financial  Institutions Examination  Council's  (FFIEC)  IT examination manual  has
been the industry nonr,  but it needs to be updated.
In many countries, IT examiners  have to follow guidelines that are, in effect, a modified
version  of the  FFIEC  IT  examination  manual.  These  IT  examiners  perform  "risk  scoping,"  a
practice wherein  they only check new systems or software installations that have  occurred  since
the  last examination.  If the examiner  has checked  an institution in the past and given it a good
score,  he  or she  will not recheck  any  of the older  systems and configurations.  This approach,
however,  can be  highly problematic.  Systems  change,  and new  vulnerabilities  in software  and
configuration  appear daily. Examiners  should not assume that systems checked  in earlier  audits
32are still secure.  If the practice  of risk scoping  exists merely  to  save time and costs,  legislatures
should mandate additional  funding for regulatory agencies.
Hosting companies  such as FiServe  are examined by joint examiners  from the Office of
the  Comptroller  of the  Currency  (OCC),  the  Federal  Reserve,  Federal  Technology  Services
(FTS), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  The Bank Service Corporation Act
states that if an entity provides a data processing  service to a bank, then  it, too, can be examined.
These entities,  however,  cannot  fail  the exams.  The  examiners  note  deficiencies,  and  then the
entity and examiners agree to a plan of action. If negotiation fails, the enforcement action calls for
implementation  of a  cease-and-desist  order.  Yet  again  there  is  a  loophole.  Because  no  real
reporting requirements are in place for these hosting providers for losses or rates of intrusions, the
cease-and-desist "stick" is negated because there is no information  on which to base it. Hence, no
standard exists for the evaluation and subsequent regulation of e-security in banking institutions.
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Supervision  will  have  to  be  proactive,  given  the  hostile  nature  of  the  Internet
environment.  As  far back as  1995,  the ISO/IEC  13335,  better known as  the  Guidelines for the
33Management of IT Security (GMITS), recognized that the Internet was a hostile environment  that
would  require  the  use  of proper  electronic  security.33 Box  7  outlines  the processes  that  were
advocated.  Note  that the  layered  electronic  security risk analysis  advocated  in  this paper  (see
Annex  I  and  Box  6)  has  many  similarities  to  this  ISO  standard,  which  has  not  been  well
implemented in many types of institutions, including banks.
Toward a New Approach to Regulation and  Supervision
Redefining Regulatory Authority and  Legal Liability of Downstream Vendors. Regulatory
agencies  need  improved  powers  and  the  appropriate  authority  to  regulate  fully  all third-party
money transmitters. Their budgets  and legislative tools will need to increase and the means found
to  rely  on  auditing  companies  (if properly  reformed)  and  the  insurance  sectors  of emerging
markets  to play a  role  in this  process.  The  following regulatory  and  compliance  actions might
help mitigate the threat of system compromise yet not extend the safety net. In addition, adoption
of processes  to monitor the extent to which financial  services providers  adopt and employ better
layered  electronic  security risk-management  practices  will be essential  as part of any enhanced
regulatory and compliance regime.
Regulatory
*  Expand the circle of regulated entities to include those elements that traffic in or assist in
money transmission  and directly connect to any payment system.
*  Review regulatory goals and needs in an electronic  environment.
*  Train  audit  and  examination  special  teams  in risk  analysis,  risk management,  and  IT
issues.
- *  Revisit capital  adequacy requirements  and the definition  of operational  risk to evaluate
how best to accommodate  e-risks noted in this paper.
*  Provide report cards to the public on how well the financial services  industry is doing to
attain the new security objectives in this area.
*  Require clearer management responsibility and accountability to create and sustain safety
and soundness.
*  Define the regulatory paradigm for the new market.
Compliance
*  Develop analytical teams to assess and monitor e-risk management.
*  Disconnect any entity from the system that is not in compliance.
*  Require  warranties,  indemnification,  and  liability from service  providers that connect  to
the payments system.
*  Require insurance coverage to accommodate  additional  risk.
*  Institute  well-developed  reporting  requirements  for all  electronic  money  or  electronic
data losses from all service providers and financial services entities.
*  Require  infornation  sharing  between  the  regulator  and  the  financial  services  entity
concerning losses.
*  Require  artificial  intelligence  software,  and  make  affirmative  the  duty  to  report  all
irregular activity from or through any service provider.
*  Ensure  that  in  management  letters  and  other  correspondence  between  examiners  and
management of financial services providers adequate attention  focuses on communication
34between  the  systems  administrator  and  senior  management  and  even  the  board  of
directors.3 
Access, availability,  and interoperability should also be key objectives of supervision and
enforcement.  The  very  interlinked  nature  of  electronic  security  providers  and  e-enabling
companies or money transmitters implies that the traditional  regulatory structure must expand. It
does  not  imply  that  a  greater  number  of  entities  be  under  the  safety  net  but  rather  that  the
regulatory framework create  incentives  for accountability  in such  entities as ISPs to application
service,  software,  hardware,  monitoring  detection,  and  assessment  providers.  Liability  must
attach  to these providers just as to the directors  of those financial  institutions that contract  with
them.  These  providers  are  as  indispensable  to  the  institution's  ability  to  provide  electronic
financial  services  as lawyers and  accountants.  They should be  bonded,  licensed,  and subject  to
periodic audit and examination.
In  sum,  traditional  regulatory  schemes  are  outdated  and  cannot  adequately  address  the
new components of the payment system to determine  whether a financial  institution  is operating
in a safe and sound manner.
Coordination  in Supervision and Information Sharing  Across Agencies
In  many  countries  throughout  the  world,  supervision  and  enforcement  in  the  area  of
electronic  security  is  complicated  by  unclear  jurisdictional  lines  across  relevant  agencies.  In
practice,  often the central  bank,  the securities or banking regulator  (if separate  from the  central
bank),  law  enforcement  agencies,  and  many  other  entities  must  be  in  a  position  to  share
information  and reports. In many cases, this can be problematic  from a  legal point of view, or a
general  lack  of  incentives  may  result  in  no  established  forum  or  process  for  undertaking
coordinated action.
It is important  to seek and promote cooperation  between law enforcement  agencies  and
regulatory  authorities  for  financial  services  providers.  Increasingly,  such  cooperation  will  be
needed within and even across countries.  Such arrangements will have to go beyond the pursuit of
those engaged in money laundering activities;  it will require the development of a more accurate
and  timely  system  for reporting all  incidents  of electronic  security  breaches,  and  not just  loss-
related information. This is an important area, in which worldwide cooperation  will be needed on
an  increasing  scale.3'  To  achieve  such  cooperation  may  require  greater  harmonization  across
countries in fundamental  areas of legislation, including bank secrecy statutes.
30 During the Y2K effort, systems administrators were given more attention, but in many financial services
conglomerates, very little communication goes on between management and the systems people until after the fact. As
technology budgets and related  security issues grow in importance,  this is likely to change-but the regulatory
authorities can  mnake management more sensitive to these issues in the course of the examination  process.
" See Section X, which includes a few examples of such cooperative ventures as Computer Emergency Response
Teams (CERTS)  or the New York Electronic Crimes Task Force.
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Background
Despite  fornidable  reportage  problems  inherent  in  establishing  a  benchmark  to
actuarially  measure the risk of hack attacks, electronic identity theft, and other forns of related e-
risk, insurance  companies are writing coverage  for such risk. The development  of e-risk policies
first  occurred  in  the mid-1990s  when insurers  recognized  the  coverage  gaps or  gray areas  in
traditional  insurance  products  for  perils  on  the  Intemet.  In  response  to  those  risks,  insurers
developed  stand-alone  e-risk  policies  rather  than  adding  coverage  to  existing  property  and
liability  insurance.  Market  participants  have  used  employee  liability  coverage  as a  model  for
pricing and issuing this insurance.
In underwriting  this risk,  insurers  combined information  security  standards,  such as  the
BS7799,  with principles of risk management  that included  analysis,  avoidance, control, and risk
transfer. Today, insurers recognize the ISO 17799 information security standard, which addresses
these issues in the following  10 major sections:
1.  Business continuity planning
2.  System access  control
3.  System development  and maintenance
4.  Physical and environmental security
5.  Statutory, regulatory,  or contractual obligation compliance.
6.  Personnel  security
7.  Security  management  for  third-party  access  or  outsourcing  to  a  third-party  service
provider
8.  Computer and network management to safeguard information assets
9.  Asset classification and control
10.  Security policy management support
As part of the e-risk application  process, several  major insurers,  including AIG, Zurich,
Chubb,  St.  Paul, Progressive,  and  Lloyd's,  have  incorporated  the  ISO  17799  standards  into  a
baseline  security  questionnaire  that becomes  part of the  insurance application  in e-risk policies
they underwrite.  In order to bind coverage,  the insured must meet a certain security threshold  for
insurability,  and the  precise  nature  of such  thresholds  has  not  been  completely  standardized
within and across  countries.  In part, this reflects the very dynamic impact of technology  in this
area.  Despite these developments,  the use of e-risk policies is still nascent.
In the case  of first-party coverage,  such policies are being explicitly designed to provide
coverage  against network extortion,  computer theft, damage  to digital  assets and information  as
intellectual  property,  and  business  or  dependent  business  losses.  In  the  case  of  third-party
coverage,  such  policies  are  designed  to  cover  network  security  or  loss  event  liability  and
electronic publishing and multimedia liability.
In underwriting these special  e-risk policies,  insurers are increasingly assessing the extent
to  which  specific  providers  of financial  or other services  are  in  compliance  with appropriate
standards  in each of the 10 areas specified under ISO  17799. These areas are also relevant in the
design of appropriate  layered security  systems,  such as the guidelines in Annex I of this report.
32The authors thank Kurt Suhs of Galaxy Computing International  for very helpful written contributions to this section.
36These  types  of considerations  still  do  not  make  it  possible  to  actuarially  calculate  proper
premiums  for these forms of first- and third-party e-risk coverage.  The underlying  defects in the
information  about  intrusions  and  extortion  make  the  pricing  of  such  policies  anything  but
straightforward.
Traditional  Insurance  Policies
Typical  insurance policies have not dealt with electronic  security risks or, more broadly,
the  types  of risks  emanating  from  such  security  breaches.  For  example,  so-called  first-party
coverage in the context of commercial  property policies usually requires physical loss or damage
to property via fire but not denial-of-service  attacks via computer hackers or other types of e-risk.
Also, an employee theft exclusion is usually included in such policies; in many cases of electronic
security  breaches,  an  insider  or  former  employee  may  be  involved.  In  fact,  in  Fall  2001,  the
insurance service office explicitly excluded software-  and computer-related  losses in commercial
policies  so that coverage  would need to be sought via other specialized  policies or arrangements.
Commercial  and  crime  policies  generally  cover  theft  of money  and  securities,  not  theft  of
information,  as do many  forms of fidelity bonds. Finally, kidnap and ransom policies often limit
coverage for extortion to threat of bodily injury, not to the possibility of severe reputation damage
associated with making public penetration into a bank's systems or theft of other information.
Recently,  insurance  carriers  have  been  offering  e-risk policies  that  do  provide  cover
against  cyber risk. Here there is the broader question of how to characterize  the specific risks to
reputation  entailed  in  electronic  security  breaches  and-because  reputation  risk  is  highly
complex-the  kinds of loss payouts for which insurance  carriers would be liable. One  could just
as easily view these risks as  similar to catastrophic  risk, or perhaps  even to kidnapping risk.  The
latter is relevant not only in the case of electronic  identity theft, in which a ransom may be sought
from the financial services provider, but also in the case of a pure hack where the hacker threatens
to go public and may demand what amounts to a form of extortion payments.  Defining the nature
of the risk  in  the case  of first-party  coverage  deserves  more  thought  in  light of how industry
participants are now writing such e-risk policies..
Another  form of insurance  that is  generally  not  adequate  is  third-party  coverage.  Here
there have been gaps in the narrow provisions  for advertising injury coverage in which claims can
be  sought  only  if the injury  occurs  in the coverage  territory  during  the policy period-thereby
excluding many possible electronic  security  events. Despite refinements made to the definition of
advertising  on the Internet via the electronic data liability amendment in Fall 2001,  this is an area
that remains unresolved.  Also,  because  electronic data is not defined as tangible property,  these
forms of coverage have limited effectiveness.
Finally,  many  of the  actual  e-risk  policies  reviewed  in  preparing  this report  pay  no
attention  to the  special  risks that  wireless technologies  are  creating  in the  delivery of financial
services.  As documented in Annex  III below and in a separate paper, Mobile Risk. Management,
insurance  providers  should clearly identify the standards for financial  services providers to meet
for wireless  risk mitigation  before  they underwrite  an  e-risk policy.  In so  doing,  the  insurance
industry could play a critical role in setting standards for electronic  security risk mitigation.
Insurance  Companies as a Force  for Change
Over  time,  the  growth  in  e-commerce  liability  insurance  and,  specifically,  e-risk
insurance  is  likely  to  be  quite  substantial.  Estimates  by  AIG  suggest  that  the market  for this
insurance may be as much as $2.5 billion.
37The viability of providing this insurance  coverage  is related to more systemic approaches
to  improving  the  base  of information  for  pricing  the  electronic  security  risks  to  be  covered.
Although vendors  of electronic  security  services  are  working  with insurance  companies  on this
issue, government, industry, and law enforcement officials clearly need to find ways of improving
the  reporting  of such  information  (see  Section  IX).  Current  efforts  to  develop  public-private
partnerships to solve this problem should therefore be a high priority.
The  global  insurance  industry  can  and  should act  as  an important  force  for change  in
electronic  security  arrangements  worldwide.  First,  it  should  strive  to  improve  the  minimum
standards  for  electronic  security  and  should  strongly  advocate  enhanced  layered  electronic
security  systems (see Annex  I).  Second,  it will be interested  in improved certification  standards
for vendors of electronic  security services described  in Section m as a way of mitigating risks of
coverage  and of spreading  risk.  Third,  it will  be  concerned  with  improvements  in  worldwide
cooperation  and efforts  to improve  the data and information  available  with which to  actuarially
measure e-risks in companies and financial services providers. Finally, it will favor solutions that
require  vendors  of electronic  security  and  other  related  services  (e.g.,  hosting)  to bear  some
liability, in contrast to some of the current arrangements,  which are entered into by parties in the
financial  services industry in outsourcing arrangements  and do not create  adequate incentives  to
maintain electronic security.
IX.  Pillar V: Certification,  Standards, and the Roles of the Public and
Private Sectors
Four  potential  areas  of certification  to  address  in  the  electronic  environment  are  the
following:  software,  hardware,  IT  security  vendors,  and  electronic  transactions.  Software  and
hardware  vendors were discussed earlier in the paper. Here the main concems  are that hardware
and software  vendors often provide products  with known vulnerabilities  that should not be used
for  financial  transactions.  Yet  they  sell  these  products  and  refuse  to  provide  warranties  or
liabilities  for  them.  The  industry  could  provide  certifications  for  these  products,  but  a  better
approach  would  be  to  require  vendors  to  warrant  their  products  and  provide  either  liability
coverage or notice and disclaimers when a product is not suitable for certain uses.
Next  are  questions  about the  roles  of government  and  the  private  sector  in  certifying
aspects of electronic  financial services,  and the issue is broader than just how it relates to the PKI.
First  is  the  question  of whether  there  is  a  case  for regulators  to  license  vendors  that provide
electronic-security-related  services to the financial  sector.  Such vendors play  a role in protecting
the  integrity of one of the  eight  critical  infrastructure  components  of the  electronic  economy.
However,  licensing vendors  would  widen  the  regulatory  safety  net.  Might  another  alternative
provide assurance without unduly burdening the regulatory structure? For example, such vendors
might post a form of performance  bond, or they could be required to obtain professional liability
insurance  through  private  insurers.  Or the  industry  could  require  them  to  obtain  certification
levels, enabling them to provide certain services based on the level of certification achieved.
Probably,  industry  regulation  through  a  certification  process  will  yield  the  most
consistent results,  particularly if insurance  provides  incentives to certified  vendors  as well  as to
institutions  that use  such vendors.  This way,  regulators  can require  vendors  to  share in the risk
through professional liability. Only those parties essential to the delivery of the financial services
would be included in the regulatory net, security would be a prerequisite  for providing services to
the financial  sector,  and all would share proportionately  in the attendant risks. Thus, the scope of
38regulation  could be contained  to  those  entities,  such  as money transmitters  and ISPs, that hold
themselves  out as being  able to provide  hosting to the  financial  services  industry.  The  steps  in
brief are  for  industry to  certify vendors  to levels  of professional  ability,  have  insurance  concur
through coverage or performance bonds, and have risk appropriately shared.
At the transactional level, as part of its business practice, an institution should analyze the
benefits  that  each technology  solution  brings  to  the table  and  weigh  that against  the  costs  or
concerns  associated  with  each.  Then  it should  implement  a data  security  classification  system
through  the business  rules  engine  mechanism that  automatically  attaches  a  level  of security  to
each type of transaction.  The business criteria used  to make these decisions  should include at a
minimum the following value matrix:  integrity,  reliability, authentication,  verification,  authority,
and nonrepudiation.  The value of a transaction  should then be equal to the  sum of the total risks
associated with the transaction.
Using such a value matrix could also assist the insurance industry in evaluating coverage
risks and pricing. Moreover, it could help the financial  entity with self-monitoring by pinpointing
where  and  why particular  risks  are  greater.  The  value  matrix  would  also  help  to  enrich  the
information that is reported. The institution could use a mix of solutions, fitting the solution to the
value and risks of the underlying transaction.  Although insurance companies  could play  a role in
encouraging the security industry to set standards and even to  endorse best practices  in terms of
authorizing and verifying  transaction  elements,  setting harmonized  standards  for  authenticating
documents  and  such  related  issues  goes  beyond  the  role  of  any  private  entity  and  requires
significant cooperation between governments.
Traditionally,  encryption has been used as a means to protect the information  transferred
over the  Internet,  together  with  various  types  of protocols  (e.g.,  secure  socket  layer,  fix,  and
others)  designed  to provide  security  to  naked  or "open"  wide area  network  systems.  Although
effective,  these  mechanisms  are  meant  only  to  provide  protection  against  certain  kinds  of
vulnerabilities.
The process of securely transmitting  information  over the Internet in countries  or across
countries has led to a proliferation of public and private key providers  and related  "certification
authorities."  These  services can be provided by government agencies,  such as postal authorities;
by technology providers, such as GTE or Verisign; by telecom service providers, such as Nortel's
Entrust;  and  by  financial  services  providers.  Eight  global  financial  institutions  are  such
providers.33
Every user of public key cryptography  is freely provided a key. The creation and storage
of such keys, as well as the attendant certification processes, present major challenges. As Annex
II shows, there are many ways to authenticate that can be used along with encryption.
First,  it is  necessary  to  address  the  development  of a proper  certification  process  for
public and private keys and the levels of use of the process.  Some countries have opted to endorse
only one recognized public certification  authority (such as the postal  service).  In other countries,
both  public  and  private  authorities  provide  this  function.  Although  one  could  claim  that
certification  is a "public good" and therefore  should be kept under the control of a public entity,
such  as the post office, private  companies  could act  as certification  agents as long as there is  a
33 The certification  authority authenticates the public key by distributing it with a certificate (digitally signed by the
certification  authority). The potential liability of  the certification  authority, as well as the reputation  imnplications of
security-related  breaches, have been used as an argument for the outsourcing of the public key infrastructure to private
providers. The seven banks that are certification authorities are ABN, Bank of America,  Deustche Bank, Barclays,
Chase, Citigroup, and Hypoverensbank.
39viable means of cross-certifying  to check on the competence of the service being provided. In all
likelihood,  the desire to maintain the institution's reputation  will act as a  significant incentive  to
resolve the moral hazard problem.
Second,  governments  need  to  address  the  issues  of authentication,  confidentiality,  and
nonrepudiation  in  designing  valid  electronic  transactions,  because  these  form  the  backbone  of
transactional  activity.  Annex  I discusses  these  issues in  detail  and  compares  the  benefits  and
drawbacks  of  potential  technologies,  such  as  biometrics  and  digital  time  stamping.  More
generally,  government  needs to encourage  the development  of technologies  that can be used to
authenticate with or without  certifying.  To preserve  confidentiality,  the  government  can require
the double signing of a key or the use of certain encryption.  Again, government should encourage
the private development of solutions that maintain confidentiality  and privacy for businesses  and
consumers.  In  fact,  a  global  industry  has  already  developed,  and  many  U.S.  companies  are
providing  privacy  and  security  solutions  to  companies  and  consumers  worldwide,  as noted  in
Section  III.34
Third, the integration  of technologies  through multiple  channels for delivery of financial
services,  as  noted in  Section  III,  implies the need to  explore how  best to harmonize  standards
across  countries.  Technologies will need to interface,  but sufficient security  must be in place  so
that  commerce  can  be  conducted  across  countries  even  if  they  have  differenit  forms  of
certification.  The ISO standards  could play a constructive role (see Box 2 in Section HI), but the
challenges will not be small.
Finally, it is important to consider how to ensure an appropriate  level of trust in any given
transaction.  The  legal  or  regulatory  transactional  framework  must  be  technology-neutral.  In
reality, a variety of technologies can certify or authenticate transactional  elements and can protect
against  nonrepudiation.  The  next  subsection reviews  the  major  technologies  in  use  today  and
examines  their strengths and weaknesses.
Trust and  Confidence  in Authentication  Technologies and Certification. "Trust  and
confidence"  translates into the following:  Party A is able to  access online  services and transfers
funds from one  account  to  another.  Party A then checks  his account  balances,  and  the  correct
amount has moved from one account to the other.  At the end of the month, he goes online  again
and  confirms  that  all  activity  for that  month has  been  properly  posted  and  that  the  account
balances match his figures. As a result, he has a high level of trust and confidence  in the system.
Or Party B receives certain  monies from the government  on a monthly basis.  Or Party C sets up
automatic  bill paying  for  all  her  utilities.  Each month,  her  account  is  debited  for  the correct
amount of the utilities. Studies have shown that when someone uses a new technology,  that party
will bond with the  use of the technology  if it works  favorably  with  no complications  the  first
three  times of use.  Conversely,  assume  that Party  D approaches  an  ATM  and attempts  to take
money  from his  account.  He  inputs  his  personal  identification  number,  and  the  transaction  is
refused.  He tries again,  and it is refused again.  The third time, the  ATM machine  eats his card.
Studies show that the opportunity to create  trust in the technology has been lost. This person will
not willingly use the technology again unless no other delivery channel  is available.
PK[ Technology. An extraordinary amount of research and development money has been
spent on developing PKI and certification authorities over the past decade. As a result, PKI is the
best  known  electronic  signature  verification  technology.  (See  Annex  II.)  Clearly,  it  has  its
3 These solutions include systems providing safety in browsing to detect cookies or manage cookies; e-mail security;
and even personal  firewalls for retail consumers.
40strengths.  But  easier  and  simpler  technologies  perform just  as well.  Again,  it  is  important  to
understand  the  business  drivers  and  the  consequential  risks  in  choosing  an  appropriate
technology.  Moreover,  there  is  no  accepted  standard  legislation,  and  record  retention
requirements for certification authorities are often undefined.
Notaries. One alternative  to PKI is to offer a new type of notary license. In this scenario,
a notary could apply  for a Class A license.  This would authorize the notary to accept and certify
digital and biometric  signatures and to time-stamp  documents  and notarize manual signatures. Or
a notary could apply  for  a Class  B license.  This  would authorize  the notary  to time-stamp  and
notarize  manual  signatures  only.  Or  the  notary could  apply  for  a Class  C  license.  Under this
scheme, the notary could only notarize  manual signatures. This multi-license  notary scenario is a
tempting  resolution  to  the  issue  of nonrepudiation  for  a  number  of reasons.  First,  it  simply
expands  an existing,  accepted,  and  regulated  framework  for verifying  signatures.  It  assesses  a
greater  fee for a Class A license than for the others, and this in turn acts as a user's fee, which can
be  used by  governments  to  pay  for the  necessary  personnel  and  equipment  to  provide  online
assistance to users and to the expanded notary industry. The negatives of such a solution are also
fairly clear. In emerging markets, notaries may not be well trained to undertake this role, and they
would need to receive certifications to perform this function. Another concern is that the licensing
system,  or  in many  cases  the  notaries  themselves,  may be  subject  to corruption;  this  concern
emphasizes  the  need  for  sufficient  oversight.  Moreover,  in  the  context  of many  transactional
arrangements,  notaries  often increase the costs of transactions.
Digital Time  Stamps.  Another  alternative  to  certification  authorities  is  a  digital  time
stamp  (DTS) service  provider.  A time stamp associates  a certain  date and time with the creation
of a digital document. The time stamp can be referenced to prove that the document was recorded
at a  specific date  and time.  For example,  Party A signs a  document and wants  it time-stamped.
She computes  a message digest of the document using a secure  one-way hash function and sends
it to  a DTS  service. In return, the  DTS service  sends  back a  digital time-stamp  document.  This
includes  the message digest, the date and time it was received by the time-stamping  service, and
the digital signature of the time-stamping  service.  Later, Party A presents the document  to verify
its creation date, and a verifier recomputes  the message digest and determines  whether it matches
the  digest in the original  time-stamped  document.  The verifier then verifies the  digital signature
of the time-stamping  service.  The strengths  of this process  are  that a  message  digest  does  not
reveal the contents of the document but simply verifies that the underlying message was received
on a certain date and time. As stated, a DTS could be an added dimension to a notary's license.  In
addition,  or  separately,  the  DTS could  be provided  by the post  office  for set  fees.  Again,  this
would use an existing entity that is familiar to the consumer.
Biometrics and Certification. Biometrics is another alternative to the verification process.
Biometric  authentication  techniques  can  be  used  to  verify  the  identity  of  people  online
automatically  through  their  distinctive  physical  or  behavioral  traits.  A  biometric  identifier
represents  a  physical  characteristic  of the  user  (see  Annex  I).  The  global  recognition  of this
authentication  technology  will  assist  in  the  nonrepudiation  of  financial  transactions  and
subsequent  documentation.  These  technologies  facilitate  the  process  by  which  entities  can
transact on a medium that facilitates  anonymity.  In this case, the two issues to address would be
(1)  certifying  the  specific  biometric  technology  and  its  accuracy,  and  (2)  defining  a  digital
signature  in a broad enough manner to  allow certification  of the parties to  a transaction  through
whatever authentication technology makes sense.
In  summary,  government  should  let the  private  sector  lead  where  possible  but  should
temper  this  approach  by  adopting  open  standards;  endorsing  technology-neutral  solutions;
41encouraging  the industry to self-regulate  and certify;  and helping insurance  and other industries
use incentives to share risk and responsibility  in identifying and correcting vulnerabilities.
X.  Pillar VI:  Accuracy  of Information  on E-Security  Incidents  and
Public-Private Sector Cooperation
One action that would improve electronic  security worldwide would be the creation of a
set of national and cross-border  incentive  arrangements  encouraging  financial services providers
to  share  accurate  information  on denial-of-service  intrusions,  thefts,  hacks,  and  so  on.  Ample
evidence  shows, as noted in Section II, that no accurate  base of information exists either within or
across countries.  This  situation  limits both  awareness  and  the scope  of private  sector solutions
that  can be  provided and may  even be  increasing  the cost to companies  and  financial  services
providers of insuring against such risks.
Prompted  by  law  enforcement,  industry  participants,  and  the  academic  community,
greater public-private  cooperation is starting to become more of a reality in the United  States and,
increasingly,  in many  other countries as  well.  Some innovative examples  of such efforts, but by
no means the only ones, are described below.
The  Internet Security  Alliance  (www.isalliance.org) and the  Computer Emergency
Response Team  (CERT).35 This is  a collaborative  effort between  Carnegie  Mellon University's
CERT  Coordination  Center  and  a  cross-section  of private  international  companies  that include
NASDAQ and Mellon Financial,  TRW,  and AIG. This alliance is an industry-led,  global, cross-
sector network focused  on advancing  the security of the Internet.  CERT (see Glossary for detail)
is expanding  its operations and now has counterparts  in more than  140 countries.  It is beginning
to implement its methods for extracting this information from users on a global basis.
The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST).  FIRST brings together  a
variety  of  computer  security  incident  response  teams  from  government,  commercial,  and
academic  organizations.  FIRST  aims  to  foster  cooperation  and  coordination  in  incident
prevention, prompt rapid reaction to incidents,  and promote information  sharing among members
and the community at large. When FIRST was founded in 1990, it had  11 members. By the end of
2001, FIRST consisted of more than  100 response and security  teams,  which spanned the major
global regions.36
The Electronic Crimes Task Force (ECTF).37 The six-year-old  ECTF  focuses  primarily
on the New York area, but its network is expanding to include the rest of the United  States. The
ECTF,  a  sort of central  cyber-crime  clearinghouse  for all arms  of local,  state,  and national  law
enforcement,  is headed by the New York office of the Secret  Service and has a membership of
180  top  federal  and  local  law  enforcement  agencies  and  prosecutors.  The  ECTF  is  careful  to
guard its top secret data, but  it welcomes  new members  to its network,  which consists of about
200  companies  from the  private  sector, mostly from  the telecommunications,  banking-finance,
and vendor-services  communities.  With the  passage of the Patriot Act  in 2002, this task force
model  has been expanded  to include  the cities of Washington,  Boston,  Chicago,  San Francisco,




42InfraGard. 38 InfraGard  is  a  partnership  between  private  industry  and  the  U.S.
government,  represented  by the  FBI. The  InfraGard initiative  was  developed  to  encourage  the
exchange of information by the governnent  and the private sector. Private sector members and an
FBI field representative  form local  area  chapters,  which  set up their own boards to govern  and
share  information  within  the  membership.  Each  chapter  is  also  part  of the  larger  InfraGard
organization.  The  NIPC  (www.nipc.org),  in  conjunction  with  representatives  from  private
industry,  the  academic  community,  and  the  public  sector,  further  developed  the  InfraGard
initiative to expand direct contacts  with private sector infrastructure owners  and operators and to
share information  about cyber intrusions,  exploited vulnerabilities,  and infrastructure threats. The
initiative,  encouraging the exchange  of information  by government and private sector members,
has  continued  to  expand  through  the  formation  of additional  InfraGard  chapters  within  the
jurisdiction of each FBI field office.
All these  arrangements rely on trust, because they make  clear that they will not divulge
respondents'  identities.  In some cases, such as with the New York ECTF, partnerships have gone
so  far as  to  allow private  market participants  and  law  enforcement  agencies  involved  to  sign
explicit  nondisclosure  statements  as  a  form  of  legal  safeguard  against  disclosure  of  the
infornation  being  provided.  A  universally  trusted  third  party  collects  such  information  and
dissenmnates it without providing information  that could identify the provider,  given the possible
reputation and other damage related to such a disclosure.
A  fruitful  exercise  might  include  further  study  of  existing  arrangements  to  share
information about electronic  security breaches among industry participants,  law enforcement,  and
possibly academic  entities with expertise in the technology  issues involved.  Multilateral  lenders
such  as  the  World  Bank  might  play  a  more  active  role  in  facilitating  such  cooperation.  In
addition, the initiatives of the World Bank and the International  Monetary Fund in such areas  as
initiatives  against money laundering  and the  establishment  of financial intelligence  units (FIUs)
will  have  to  be properly  integrated  into  any  well-defined  information-sharing  framework.  For
example,  suspicious  activity  reports  often  can  lead  to  investigations  that  relate  to  electronic
security breaches and related crimes (e.g., identification  thefts).
XI.  Pillar VII: Education and Prevention of E-Security Incidents
In  many countries  throughout  the world,  statistical  analysis  reveals  that  more than  50
percent  of  electronic  security  intrusions  are  carried  out  by  insiders.  An  uneducated  or
undereducated  workforce  is  inherently  more  vulnerable  to  this  type  of incident  or  attack.  In
contrast,  a well-trained  workforce,  conscious  of security  issues,  can  add  a layer of protection.
Hence,  the  safety and  efficiency  of technology  is directly  related  to the  training and technical
education of the persons using the technology.
That  correlation  suggests  that  any  effort  to  reduce  and  prevent  the  occurrence  of
electronic  security  incidents  must  rely  on  an  extensive  educational  effort  operating  at  the
following  levels:  first, the authorities  and the persons assigned to  examine  the financial  services
providers;  second, the systems personnel and others in management  at financial services entities;
and finally, the users of financial services.
38  www.nimc.org
43Any plan  of action  to  improve  education  will  need  to  involve  a number  of important
actions, such as the following:
*  Improve awareness  and education of financial  sector participants  about cyber ethics and
appropriate  user  behavior  on  networked  systems.  Ensure  that  employees  (and  also
management),  especially  those  involved  in  payment  system  transactions  and  systems
administrators, are aware of the risks and proper approaches to layered.security.
*  Create institution-wide e-security policies on appropriate behavior and the corresponding
channels  for reporting  intrusions  or  incidents  in  close  coordination  with  any effort  to
improve worldwide information in intrusions (see Section X).
*  Develop  awareness  in  the banking  community  in  emerging markets  about  the need  to
formulate  "incident  response  plans."  In  many  countries,  this  will  involve  efforts  to
improve  capacity;  to  teach  risk  assessment,  risk management,  and  prevention;  and  to
develop the essential components of a good security program.
*  Facilitate  cooperation  and transfer of know-how among  law enforcement  entities,  FlUs,
and supervisory agencies  in developed  and  emerging  markets  through  such methods  as
more  active  exchange  programs  between  personnel.  This  kind  of  cooperation  can
facilitate  better  education  of  law  enforcement  officials,  supervisors,  and  others  in
emerging market economies about how to deal with e-security.
*  Launch  some education  initiatives in this area targeted  to bank examiners,  such as at the
Toronto  Institute,  the  Federal  Reserve  courses  for  bank  examiners,  or  the  Financial
Stability  Institute.  The  focus of the  education  should  be on techniques  for determining
whether  the layered  electronic  security  systems  of brick-and-click  banks  can  be better
assessed and evaluated.
*  Consider  developing  a  cross-border  university  outreach  program  (e.g.,  involving  such
entities  as  Carnegie  Mellon's  CERT)  to  promote  the  training  of  future  e-security
professionals,  and develop  innovative approaches  to sharing of information  in e-security
incidents.  Some  private  entities  (e.g.,  Cisco)  provide  training  at  reduced  costs  for
government.
*  Develop  online programs  to improve  education of users of e-financial  services;  develop
processes  and incentives to have customers report suspicious activities  in the use of their
accounts.  Users and the information  they provide  are critical  to any overall  approach  to
electronic security and risk-sharing.
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45Glossary
A-
Abuse  of privilege: When a user performs an action that he or she should not have performed
according to organizational policy or law.
Access: The ability to enter a secured area, and the process of interacting with a system. Used as
either a verb or a noun.
Access  authorization: Permission granted to users, programs, or workstations.
Access  control: A set of procedures performed by hardware,  software,  and administrators to
monitor access,  identify users requesting access, record access attempts, and grant or deny access.
Access-sharing:  Permitting two or more users simultaneous access to file servers or devices.
Alphanumeric key: A sequence of letters, numbers, symbols,  and blank spaces from one to
eighty characters long.
ANSI: The American National Standards Institute. ANSI develops standards for transmission
storage,  languages,  and protocols, and represents the United States in the ISO (International
Standards Organization).
Application level  gateway  [firewall]:  A firewall system in which service is provided by
processes  that maintain complete TCP (telecommunications  protocol) connection state and
sequencing.  Application-level  firewalls often readdress traffic so outgoing traffic appears to have
originated from the firewall rather than the internal host.
Application logic:  The computational aspects of an application,  including a list of instructions
that tells a software application  how to operate.
Audit: The independent collection of records to access their veracity and completeness.
Audit trail: An audit trail may be on paper or on disk. In computer security systems, it is a
chronological  record of when users log in, how long they are engaged in various activities,  what
they were doing, and whether any actual or attempted security violations occurred.
Authenticate: In networking,  to establish the validity of a user or a communications  server.
Authentication: The process of establishing the legitimacy of a node or user before allowing
access to requested information. During the process, the user enters a name or account number
(identification)  and password  (authentication).
Authentication tool: A software or hand-held hardware  "key" or "token" used during the user
authentication process. See key and token.
Authentication token: A portable device for user authentication.  Authentication tokens operate
by challenge and response, time-based  code sequences,  or other techniques that may include
paper-based lists of one-time passwords.
Authorization: The process of determining what number of activities is permitted. Usually,
authorization is in the context of authentication.  Once the user is authenticated,  the user may be
authorized different levels of access or activity.
46Availability:  The portion of time a system can be used for productive work, expressed as a
percentage.
-B-
Back door: An entry point to a program or a system that is hidden or disguised, often created by
the software's author for maintenance.  A certain  sequence of control characters permits access to
the system manager account. If the back door becomes known, unauthorized users (or malicious
software) can gain entry and cause damage.
Bandwidth: Capacity of a network or data connection, often measured in kilobits/second  (kbps)
for digital transmissions.
Bastion host: A system that has been hardened  to resist attack at some critical point of entry and
that is installed  on a network in such a way that it is expected to come under attack. Bastion hosts
are often components of firewalls, or may be "outside" Web servers or public access systems.
Generally, a bastion host is running some form of general-purpose  operating system (LNIX,
VMS, WNT, etc.) rather than a ROM-based or firmware  operating system.
Biometric access  control: Any means of controlling access through human measurements such
as fingerprints and iris scans.
Business-critical applications: The vital software needed to run a business,  whether custom-
written or commercially packaged,  such as accounting or finance.
-C-
CERT: The Computer Emergency Response Team, established at Carnegie-Mellon University
after the 1988 Internet worm attack named Momis.
Challenge/response:  A security procedure in which one communicator requests authentication of
another communicator and the latter replies with a preestablished  appropriate reply.
Chroot: A technique under UNIX whereby a process is permanently restricted to an isolated
subset of the file system.
Clientdevice:  Hardware that retrieves information  from a server.
Clustering: A group of independent  systems working together as a single system. Clustering
technology allows groups of servers to access a single disk array containing applications  and data.
Coded fle: In encryption, a coded file contains unreadable information.
Combined evaluation: Method using proxy and state or filter evaluations  as allowed by
administrator.  See Stateful evaluation.
Communications server: Procedures designed to ensure that telecommunications messages
maintain their integrity and are not accessible by unauthorized individuals.
Computer security: Technological and managerial procedures applied to computer systems to
ensure the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of information managed by the computer
system.
47Computer security audit: An independent evaluation of the controls employed to ensure
appropriate protection of an organization's information assets.
Cryptographic checksum:  A one-way function applied to a file to produce a unique
"fingerprint"  of the file for later reference.  Checksum systems are a primary means of detecting
file-system tampering on UNIX.
-D  -
Data-driven attack: A form of attack that is encoded in innocuous-seeming data executed by a
user or other software to implement an attack. In the case of firewalls, a data-driven attack is a
concern because it may get through the firewall in data form and launch an attack against a
system behind the firewall.
Data encryption standard (DES):  An encryption standard developed by EBM and then tested
and adopted by the National Bureau of Standards. Published in 1977, the DES standard has
proven itself over nearly 20 years of use in both government and private  sectors.
Decode:  Conversion of encoded text to plain text through the use of a code.
Decrypt: Conversion of either encoded or enciphered text into plain text.
Dedicated: A special-purpose  device.  Although capable of performing other duties, it is assigned
to only one.
Defense  in depth: The security approach whereby  each system on the network is secured to the
greatest possible degree. May be used in conjunction with firewalls.
DES: Data encryption standard.
DNS  spoofing:  Assuming the Domain Name Server (DNS) name of another system by either
corrupting the name service cache of a victim system or compromising a domain name server for
a valid domain.
Dual-homed  gateway:  (l) A system that has two or more network interfaces,  each of which is
connected to a different network. In firewall configurations, a dual-homed gateway usually acts to
block or filter some or all of the traffic trying to pass between the networks. (2) A firewall
implement that does not use a screening router.
-E -
E-mail bombs: Code that when executed sends many messages to the same address  for the
purpose of using up disk space or overloading the e-mail or Web server.
Encrypting router: See Tunneling router and Virtual network perimeter.
Encryption: The process of scrambling files or programs, changing one character string to
another through an algorithm (such as the DES algorithm).
End-to-end  encryption: Encryption  at the point of origin in a network, followed by decryption at
the destination.
Environment: The aggregate of external circumstances,  conditions, and events that affect the
development,  operation, and maintenance  of a system.ERP (enterprise resource planning): ERP systems permit organizations to manage resources
across the enterprise and completely integrate manufacturing systems.
Extranet: Extranet refers to extending the LAN via remote or Internet access to partners outside
your organization, such as frequent suppliers and purchasers.  Such relationships should be over
an authenticated link to authorized segments of the LAN and are frequently encrypted for
privacy.
-F-
Fat client: A computing device, such as a PC or Macintosh, that includes an operating system,
RAM, ROM, a powerful processor,  and a wide range of installed applications that can execute on
the desktop or 100 percent on the server under a server-based  computing architecture.  Fat clients
can operate in a server-based computing environment.
Fault tolerance: A design method that ensures continued systems operation in the event of
individual failures by providing redundant system elements.
Firewall: A system or combination of systems that enforces a boundary between two or more
networks.
Flooding programs: Implementing  a code that when executed will bombard the selected system
with requests in an effort to slow down or shut down the system.
Anonymous  FTP [Define  acronym]: A guest account that allows anyone to login to the FTP
server. It can be a point to begin access on the host server.
-G-
Gateway:  A bridge between two networks.
Generic utilities: General purpose code and devices-that is, screen grabbers  and sniffers that
look at data and capture such informnation as passwords, keys, and secrets.
Global security: The ability of an access-control package  to permit protection across  a variety of
mainframe environments,  providing users with a common security interface to all.
GPS (global  positioning system)  : Used primarily for navigation, this satellite-based system
maps the location of various receivers  on earth.
Granularity: The relative fineness or coarseness by which a mechanism can be adjusted.
GSM: Groupe Special Mobile, the European Union's digital cellular standard.
-H-
ack: Any software in which a significant portion of the code was originally  another program.
ackers: Those intent on entering an environment to which they are not entitled entry for
hatever purpose (e.g., entertainment, profit, theft, prank), usually involving iterative techniques,
calating to more advanced methodologies,  and use of devices to intercept the communications
operty of another.
49Host-based security: The technique of securing an individual  system from attack. Host-based
security is operating system- and version-dependent.
Hot standby: A backup system configured  in such a way that it may be used if the system goes
down.
Hybrid gateway:  An unusual configuration  with routers that maintain the complete state of the
TCP/IP connections or examine the traffic to try to detect and prevent attack (may involve host).
If very complicated, it is difficult to attach, maintain, and audit.
-I-
ICA: An acronym for Citrix's Independent Computing Architecture,  a three-part server-based
computing technology that separates  an application's logic from its user interface and allows  100
percent application execution on the server.
IIETF (The Internet Engineering Task Force): A public forum that develops standards and
resolves operational  issues for the Internet. IETF is purely voluntary.
Information systems technology:  The protection of information assets from accidental or
intentional but unauthorized  disclosure, modification, or destruction or the inability to process
that information.
Insider attack: An attack originating  from inside a protected network.
Internet: A web of different,  intercommunicating networks funded by both commercial  and
government  organizations.  The Internet had its roots in early  1969 when the ARPANET was
formed. ARPA stands for Advanced Research Projects Agency (which was part of the U.S.
Department of Defense).  One of the goals of ARPANET was research in distributed computer
systems for military purposes. The first configuration  involved four computers and was designed
to demonstrate the feasibility of building networks using computers  dispersed over a wide area.
The advent of open networks in the late 1980s required a new model of communications. The
amalgamation  of many types of systems into mixed environments  demanded a better translator
between these operating systems and a nonproprietary  approach to networking in general.
Telecommunications  Protocol/Internet Protocol  (TCP/IP) provided the best solutions.
Intrusion detection system: A system dedicated to the detection of break-ins or break-in
attempts manually either via software expert systems that operate on logs or other information
available on the network.
IP sniffmg:  Stealing network addresses by reading the packets.  Harmful data is then sent
stamped with internal trusted addresses.
IP splicing:  An attack whereby an active, established session is intercepted and co-opted by the
attacker. EP splicing attacks may occur after an authentication has been made, permitting the
attacker to assume the role of an already authorized user. Primary protections against IP splicing
rely on encryption  at the session or network layer.
IP spoofing:  An attack whereby a system attempts to illicitly impersonate  another system by
using its EP network address.
ISO (International Standards Organization): Sets standards for data communications.
ISSA:  Information Systems  Security Association.
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Key: In encryption, a sequence of characters used to encode and decode a file. One can enter a
key in two formats: alphanumeric  and condensed (hexadecimal).  In the network access security
market, "key" often refers to the "token," or authentication tool, which is a device used to send
and receive challenges  and responses during the user authentication process. Keys may be small,
hand-held hardware devices similar to pocket calculators or credit cards or they may be loaded
onto a PC as copy-protected  software.
Least privilege: Designing operational  aspects of a system to operate with a minimum amount of
system privilege. This design reduces the authorization level at which various actions are
performed and decreases the chance that a process or user with high privileges may be caused to
perform unauthorized activity resulting in a security breach.
Local area network (LAN):  An interconnected system of computers  and peripherals;  LAN users
share data stored on hard disks and can share printers connected to the network.
Logging: The process of storing information about events that occurred on the firewall or
network.
Log processing:  How audit logs are processed, searched for key events, or summarized.
Log retention: How long audit logs are retained and maintained.
Mobile  code: A program downloaded  from the Intemet that runs automatically  on a computer
with little or no user interaction.
Multi-user capability: The ability for multiple concurrent users to log on and run applications
from a single server.
-N  -
Network computer (NC): A "thin" client hardware device that executes applications locally by
downloading them from the network. NCs adhere to a specification jointly developed by Sun,
IBM, Oracle, Apple, and Netscape. NCs typically run Java applets within a Java browser or Java
applications within the Java Virtual Machine.
Network computing architecture: A computing architecture  in which components are
dynamically downloaded from the network into the client device  for execution by the client. The
Java programming language is at the core of network computing.
Network-level  firewall:  A firewall in which traffic is examined at the network protocol packet
level.
Network worm: A program or command file that uses a computer network as a means  for
adversely affecting a system's integrity, reliability, or availability.  A network worm may attack
from one system to another by establishing  a network connection. The worm is usually a self-
51contained program that does not need to attach itself to a host file to infiltrate network after
network.
NIPC (National Infrastructure Protection Center): NIPC brings together representatives  from
U.S. govemment agencies,  state and local governments,  and the private  sector in a partnership  to
protect the nation's critical infrastructures.  NIPC's mission is to serve as the U.S. govenmment's
focal point for threat assessment, waming, investigation, and response in cases of threats or
attacks against electronic  critical infrastructures.
0-
One-time password: In network security,  a password issued only once as a result of a challenge-
response authentication process.  Cannot be "stolen" or reused for unauthorized access.
Operating system: System software that controls a computer and its peripherals. Modem
operating systems,  such as Windows 95 and NT, handle many of a computer's basic functions.
Orange book: The Department of Defense Trusted Computer  System Evaluation Criteria. It
provides information to classify computer systems, defining the degree of trust that may be
placed in them.
p 
Password: A secret code assigned to a user, known by the computer system. Knowledge of the
password associated with the user ID is considered proof of authorization.  (See One-time
password.)
Performance: A major factor in determining the overall productivity of a system, performance  is
primarily tied to availability, throughput, and response time.
Perimeter-based security: The technique of securing a network by controlling access to all entry
and exit points of the network.
PIN (personal identification  number): In computer security, a PIN is known only to the user
and used during the authentication process.  (See Challenge/response;  Two-factor authentication.)
Policy: Organizational-level  rules governing  acceptable use of computing resources,  security
practices, and operational procedures.
Private key: In encryption, one key (or password) is used to both lock and unlock data. Compare
with Public key.
Protocols: Agreed-on methods of communications used by computers.
Proxy: (1) A method of replacing the code for service applications with an improved version that
is more security-aware.  Preferred method is by "service communities"  rather than individual
applications. Evolved from socket implementations.  (2) A software agent that acts on behalf of a
user. Typical proxies accept a connection from a user, make a decision as to whether the user or
client IP address is permitted to use the proxy, perhaps does additional authentication,  and then
completes a connection on behalf of the user to a remote destination.
Public key: In encryption, a two-key system in which the key used to lock data is made public,
so everyone can "lock." A second, private, key is used to unlock or decrypt.
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Remote  access:  The hookup of a remote computing device via communications lines, such as
ordinary phone lines or wide area networks, to access network applications and information.
Remote  presentation services  protocol: A protocol is a set of rules and procedures for
exchanging data between computers  on a network. A remote presentation  services protocol
transfers user interface, keystrokes, and mouse movements between a server and a client.
Risk analysis:  The analysis of an organization's  information resources, existing controls, and
computer system vulnerabilities.  It establishes a potential level of damage in dollars or other
assets.
Rogue program: Any program intended to damage programs or data. Encompasses malicious
Trojan horses.
RSA: A public key cryptosystem named by its inventors-Rivest,  Shamir, and Adelman-who
hold the patent.
- S -
Salami slice:  A hacker method for the acquisition of funds. A database of account information is
copied.  Then on a later date all accounts  are charged a minimal amount, so as not to arouse
suspicion.
Scalability:  The ability to expand a computing solution to support large numbers of users without
having an impact on performance.
Screened host gateway: A host on a network behind a screening router. The degree to which a
screened host may be accessed depends on the screening rules in the router.
Screened  subnet: An isolated subnet created behind a screening router to protect the private
network. The degree to which the subnet may be accessed depends on the screening rules in the
router.
Screening  router: A router configured to permit or deny traffic using filtering techniques; based
on a set of permission rules installed by the administrator.  A component of many firewalls
usually used to block traffic between the network and specific hosts on an IP port level. Not very
secure; used when speed is the only decision criterion.
Server: The control computer on a local area network that controls software access to
workstations, printers, and other parts of the network.
Server-based computing: An innovative,  server-based approach to delivering business-critical
applications to end-user devices, whereby an application's logic executes on the server and only
the user interface is transmitted  across a network to the client. Its benefits include single-point
management,  universal application access, bandwidth-independent performance,  and improved
security for business applications.
Server farm: A group of servers that are linked together as a "single system image" to provide
centralized administration and horizontal  scalability.
53Session shadowing:  A feature of Citrix WinFrame  and MetaFrame that allows administrators
and technical  support staff to join remotely or take control of a user's session for diagnosis,
support, and training.
Session  stealing:  See IP splicing.
Single-point  control: Helps to reduce the total cost of application ownership by enabling
applications and data to be deployed, managed, and supported at the server. Single-point control
enables application installations,  updates, and additions to be made once, on the server, and then
instantly made available to users anywhere.
Smart card: A credit card-sized device with embedded microelectronics  circuitry for storing
information about an individual. This is not a key or token, as used in the remote access
authentication  process.
Social engineering:  An attack based on deceiving users or administrators at the target site. Social
engineering attacks are typically carried out by telephoning users or operators and pretending to
be an authorized user to attempt to gain illicit access to systems.
Stateful evaluation: Methodology using mixture of proxy or filtering technology intermittently,
depending on perceived threat (or need for speed.)
-T -
TCO (total cost of ownership):  A model that helps IT professionals understand and manage the
budgeted (direct) and unbudgeted (indirect) costs incurred for acquiring,  maintaining,  and using
an application  or a computing system. TCO normally includes training, upgrades, and
administration as well as the purchase price. Lowering TCO through single-point control is a key
benefit of server-based computing.
Thin client: A low-cost computing device that works in a server-centric  computing model. Thin
clients typically do not require state-of-the-art,  powerful processors and large amounts of RAM
and ROM because  they access applications from a central server or network.  Thin clients can
operate in a server-based  computing environment.
Token: In authentication,  a device used to send and receive challenges and responses  during the
user authentication process. Tokens may be small, hand-held hardware  devices similar to pocket
calculators  or credit cards. See Key.
Trojan horse: (1) Any program designed to do things the user of the program did not intend to
do or that disguise its harmful intent. (2) A program that installs itself while the user is making an
authorized entry, and then is used to break in and exploit the system.
Tunneling router: A router or system capable of routing traffic by encrypting it and
encapsulating it for transmission across an untrusted network for eventual de-encapsulation  and
decryption.
'Turn commands: Commands inserted to forward mail to another address for interception.
Two-factor authentication: Two-factor authentication  is based on something a user knows
(factor one) plus something the user has (factor two). In order to access  a network, the user must
have both "factors," just as he or she must have an ATM card and a PIN to retrieve money from a
54bank account.  In order to be authenticated during the challenge and response process,  users must
have this specific (private) information.
-U-
User: Any person who interacts directly with a computer system.
User ID: A unique character string that identifies a user.
User identification: User identification is the process by which a user identifies herself to the
system as a valid user-as opposed to authentication, which is the process of establishing that the
user is indeed that user and has a right to use the system.
User interface: The part of an application that the user works with. User interfaces can be text-
driven, such as DOS, or graphical, such as Windows.
- V  -
VPN (virtual private network): A private connection between two machines that sends private
data traffic over a shared or public network, such as the Intemet. VPN technology lets an
organization securely extend its network services over the Internet to remote  users, branch
offices, and partner companies.
Virtual network perimeter: A network that appears to be a single protected network behind
firewalls, but actually encompasses encrypted  virtual links over untrusted networks.
Virus: A self-replicating code segment.  Viruses may or may not contain attack programs or
trapdoors.
-W
WEP (Wireless Equivalent Protocol):  A protocol designed to be implemented over WLANs to
offer the same security features as a physical  wire: confidentiality,  access control, and data
integrity.
Windows-based terminal (WBT): A fixed-function thin-client  device that connects to a Citrix
WinFrame or MetaFrame server and terminal server to provide application access. The key
differentiator of a WBT from other thin devices is that all application execution occurs on the
server; there is no downloading or local processing of applications  at the client.
WLAN (wireless  local area network): A wireless Network that corresponds to wireless laptops.
- XYZ -
Y2K: An acronym for the year 2000 problem, which involved three issues: two-digit data
storage,  leap-year calculations, and special meanings for dates.
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